The legendary investor calls venture capital's business model a "scam" because VCs get paid management fees regardless of performance. He argues this structure incentivizes deploying capital even on overly risky bets, as the manager's personal downside is limited while their upside is significant.

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The 'classic' VC model hunts for unproven talent in niche areas. The now-dominant 'super compounder' model argues the biggest market inefficiency is underestimating the best companies. This justifies investing in obvious winners at any price, believing that outlier returns will cover the high entry cost.

Underperforming VC firms persist because the 7-10+ year feedback loop for returns allows them to raise multiple funds before performance is clear. Additionally, most LPs struggle to distinguish between a manager's true investment skill and market-driven luck.

Club Penguin's co-founder warns that accepting VC money creates immense pressure to become a billion-dollar company. This often crushes otherwise successful businesses that could have been profitable at a smaller scale, making founders worse off in the long run.

Unlike shares purchased with personal capital, stock options are often treated like "house money." This incentivizes CEOs to make excessively risky bets with shareholder capital because they capture all the upside but are not punished for failure, leading to poor capital allocation.

Despite perceptions of quick wealth, venture capital is a long-term game. Investors can face periods of 10 years or more without receiving any cash distributions (carry) from their funds. This illiquidity and delayed gratification stand in stark contrast to the more immediate payouts seen in public markets or big tech compensation.

Sequoia's internal philosophy dictates that venture capital is not a downside minimization game. A fund with a write-off rate below 40% is seen as not taking enough risk to generate outlier returns. This counter-intuitive metric prioritizes bold bets over preserving capital on every deal.

Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.

VCs are incentivized to deploy large amounts of capital. However, the best companies often have strong fundamentals, are capital-efficient, or even profitable, and thus don't need to raise money. This creates a challenging dynamic where the best investments, like Sequoia's investment in Zoom, are the hardest to get into.

The institutionalization of venture capital as a career path changes investor incentives. At large funds, individuals may be motivated to join hyped deals with well-known founders to advance their careers, rather than taking on the personal risk of backing a contrarian idea with higher return potential.

The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.