The institutionalization of venture capital as a career path changes investor incentives. At large funds, individuals may be motivated to join hyped deals with well-known founders to advance their careers, rather than taking on the personal risk of backing a contrarian idea with higher return potential.
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In today's founder-centric climate, many VCs avoid confrontation to protect their reputation (NPS) within the founder network. This fear of being blacklisted leads them to abdicate their fiduciary duty to shareholders, failing to intervene even when a company's performance is dire and hard decisions are needed.
The 'classic' VC model hunts for unproven talent in niche areas. The now-dominant 'super compounder' model argues the biggest market inefficiency is underestimating the best companies. This justifies investing in obvious winners at any price, believing that outlier returns will cover the high entry cost.
There's a surprising disconnect between the perceived brilliance of individual investors at large, well-known private equity firms and their actual net-to-LP returns, which are often no better than the market median. This violates the assumption that top talent automatically generates outlier results.
The worst feeling for an investor is not missing a successful deal they didn't understand, but investing against their own judgment in a company that ultimately fails. This emotional cost of violating one's own conviction outweighs the FOMO of passing on a hot deal.
Y Combinator's model pushes companies to raise at high valuations, often bypassing traditional seed rounds. Simultaneously, mega-funds cherry-pick the most proven founders at prices seed funds cannot compete with. This leaves traditional seed funds fighting for a narrowing and less attractive middle ground.
Large, contrarian investments feel like career risk to partners in a traditional VC firm, leading to bureaucracy and diluted conviction. Founder-led firms with small, centralized decision-making teams can operate with more decisiveness, enabling them to make the bold, potentially firm-defining bets that consensus-driven partnerships would avoid.
The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.
The career arcs of venture and buyout investors differ starkly. VCs rely on networks relevant to young founders, leading some to retire by 45 as connections become stale. In contrast, buyout investing is an apprenticeship business where age and experience are increasingly valued.
Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.
Unlike operating companies that seek consistency, VC firms hunt for outliers. This requires a 'stewardship' model that empowers outlier talent with autonomy. A traditional, top-down CEO model that enforces uniformity would stifle the very contrarian thinking necessary for venture success. The job is to enable, not manage.
