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VCs' herd mentality stems from a need for job security. To avoid looking foolish to their own partners, they often vet deals with competing VCs first. This cross-firm consensus-building is a defensive mechanism to avoid being fired for a 'stupid' deal.
David Ulevitch of a16z recounts a major conflict with another firm that he didn't even know existed. The issue wasn't a specific deal but a fundamental disagreement about firm operations. This highlights that tensions can simmer unseen and resolution requires addressing core philosophies, not just transactional disagreements.
In today's founder-centric climate, many VCs avoid confrontation to protect their reputation (NPS) within the founder network. This fear of being blacklisted leads them to abdicate their fiduciary duty to shareholders, failing to intervene even when a company's performance is dire and hard decisions are needed.
Venture investors aren't concerned when a portfolio company launches products that compete with their other investments. This is viewed as a positive signal of a massive winner—a company so dominant it expands into adjacent categories, which is the ultimate goal.
Firms like Sequoia investing in direct competitors (OpenAI and Anthropic) shows that late-stage venture has evolved. When taking small, non-board seat stakes for hundreds of millions, firms act like public market funds, buying a portfolio of category leaders without the information access that would create a true conflict.
Large, contrarian investments feel like career risk to partners in a traditional VC firm, leading to bureaucracy and diluted conviction. Founder-led firms with small, centralized decision-making teams can operate with more decisiveness, enabling them to make the bold, potentially firm-defining bets that consensus-driven partnerships would avoid.
Competing to be a founder's "first call" is a crowded, zero-sum game. A more effective strategy is to be the "second call"—the specialist a founder turns to for a specific, difficult problem after consulting their lead investor. This positioning is more scalable, collaborative, and allows for differentiated value-add.
Deciding whether to back a competitor is fraught with conflict. When the speaker considered investing in Stripe, a Square executive called it a conflict, but CEO Jack Dorsey approved. This shows opinions on threats vary internally, justifying multiple checks before proceeding with a potentially conflicting investment.
Managing VCs is harder than managing corporate execs. VCs are high-IQ, disagreeable idea generators who dislike rules. The burden is on leadership to design an organization that minimizes conflict, as VCs can easily 'wreck each other's businesses' through competing investments, making interpersonal issues far more destructive.
Sequoia makes consensus investment decisions, viewing each deal as "our investment." This is only possible through a culture of high trust and "front stabbing"—brutally honest, direct debate about a deal's merits. This prevents passive aggression and ensures collective ownership.
The institutionalization of venture capital as a career path changes investor incentives. At large funds, individuals may be motivated to join hyped deals with well-known founders to advance their careers, rather than taking on the personal risk of backing a contrarian idea with higher return potential.