Valinor operates as a holding company, acquiring and running defense tech firms that address niche but critical government needs. This model services the vast market of smaller-TAM opportunities often ignored by traditional VCs seeking billion-dollar "moonshot" outcomes.
The conflict in Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of expensive, "exquisite" military platforms (like tanks) to inexpensive technologies (like drones). This has shifted defense priorities toward cheap, mass-producible, "attritable" systems. This fundamental change in product and economics creates a massive opportunity for startups to innovate outside the traditional defense prime model.
The Under Secretary of War's primary job is not just to fund technology, but to actively cultivate an ecosystem of new defense contractors. The stated goal is to create five more major companies capable of challenging established primes like Lockheed Martin, fostering competition and bringing new capabilities into the defense sector.
Unlike traditional contractors paid for hours, Anduril invests its own capital to build products it believes the government needs. This model incentivizes speed and effectiveness, as profit is tied to successful products, not billable hours. This shifts the financial risk from the taxpayer to the company.
Flock Safety was dismissed by VCs because its initial market of neighborhood associations seemed too small. This perception of a small TAM acted as a moat, deterring competition and allowing them to build a foundation to later expand into much larger government contracts.
Valinor CEO Julie Busch argues that the VC push for dual-use (government and commercial) products is a distraction. Most government needs are single-use, creating a massive, underserved market. Furthermore, it's far easier to adapt a government-first product for commercial use than the other way around due to stringent compliance hurdles.
Unlike traditional contractors paid for time and materials, Anduril invests its own capital to develop products first. This 'defense product company' model aligns incentives with the government's need for speed and effectiveness, as profits are tied to rapid, successful delivery, not prolonged development cycles.
Marketing a defense company is fundamentally different from marketing a consumer product. Instead of a broad "one-to-all" campaign targeting millions of customers, defense marketing is a "one-to-few," hyper-targeted effort aimed at a small group of influential government decision-makers who could all fit in a single conference room.
Traditional defense primes are coupled to customer requirements and won't self-fund speculative projects. "Neo primes" like Epirus operate like product companies, investing their own capital to address military capability gaps, proving out new technologies, and then selling the finished solution.
Unlike consumer or enterprise software, the defense industry has a single major customer per country. This structure favors consolidation. The path to success is not to be a niche SaaS tool but to build a platform that becomes a "national champion," deeply integrated with the nation's defense strategy.
The go-to-market strategy for defense startups has evolved. While the first wave (e.g., Anduril) had to compete directly with incumbents, the 'Defense 2.0' cohort can grow much faster. They act as suppliers and partners to legacy prime contractors, who are now actively seeking to integrate their advanced technology.