Undersecretary Rogers warns against "safetyist" regulatory models for AI. She argues that attempting to code models to never produce offensive or edgy content fetters them, reduces their creative and useful capacity, and ultimately makes them less competitive globally, particularly against China.
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The current industry approach to AI safety, which focuses on censoring a model's "latent space," is flawed and ineffective. True safety work should reorient around preventing real-world, "meatspace" harm (e.g., data breaches). Security vulnerabilities should be fixed at the system level, not by trying to "lobotomize" the model itself.
The idea of nations collectively creating policies to slow AI development for safety is naive. Game theory dictates that the immense competitive advantage of achieving AGI first will drive nations and companies to race ahead, making any global regulatory agreement effectively unenforceable.
When addressing AI's 'black box' problem, lawmaker Alex Boris suggests regulators should bypass the philosophical debate over a model's 'intent.' The focus should be on its observable impact. By setting up tests in controlled environments—like telling an AI it will be shut down—you can discover and mitigate dangerous emergent behaviors before release.
In the high-stakes race for AGI, nations and companies view safety protocols as a hindrance. Slowing down for safety could mean losing the race to a competitor like China, reframing caution as a luxury rather than a necessity in this competitive landscape.
Instead of trying to legally define and ban 'superintelligence,' a more practical approach is to prohibit specific, catastrophic outcomes like overthrowing the government. This shifts the burden of proof to AI developers, forcing them to demonstrate their systems cannot cause these predefined harms, sidestepping definitional debates.
Many AI safety guardrails function like the TSA at an airport: they create the appearance of security for enterprise clients and PR but don't stop determined attackers. Seasoned adversaries can easily switch to a different model, rendering the guardrails a "futile battle" that has little to do with real-world safety.
Mark Cuban advocates for a specific regulatory approach to maintain AI leadership. He suggests the government should avoid stifling innovation by over-regulating the creation of AI models. Instead, it should focus intensely on monitoring the outputs to prevent misuse or harmful applications.
Silicon Valley's economic engine is "permissionless innovation"—the freedom to build without prior government approval. Proposed AI regulations requiring pre-approval for new models would dismantle this foundation, favoring large incumbents with lobbying power and stifling the startup ecosystem.
AI companies engage in "safety revisionism," shifting the definition from preventing tangible harm to abstract concepts like "alignment" or future "existential risks." This tactic allows their inherently inaccurate models to bypass the traditional, rigorous safety standards required for defense and other critical systems.
An FDA-style regulatory model would force AI companies to make a quantitative safety case for their models before deployment. This shifts the burden of proof from regulators to creators, creating powerful financial incentives for labs to invest heavily in safety research, much like pharmaceutical companies invest in clinical trials.