VCs in 2008 rejected Shopify because the existing market of 40,000 online stores was too small. They failed to see that Shopify wasn't just serving a market; its friction-reducing product would create a much larger one.
Initial data suggested the market for design tools was too small to build a large business. Figma's founders bet on the trend that design was becoming a key business differentiator, which would force the market to expand. They focused on building for the trend, not the existing TAM.
Collaborative Fund's Craig Shapiro passed on Uber's seed round ($4M valuation) because he perceived it as a 'black car' service for the rich. This highlights the common investor mistake of underestimating a market by failing to see how a premium service can eventually democratize an entire industry.
Investors often reject ideas in markets where previous companies failed, a bias they call "scar tissue." This creates an opportunity for founders who can identify a key change—like new AI technology or shifting consumer behavior—that makes a previously impossible idea now viable.
Flock Safety was dismissed by VCs because its initial market of neighborhood associations seemed too small. This perception of a small TAM acted as a moat, deterring competition and allowing them to build a foundation to later expand into much larger government contracts.
Live-shopping platform Whatnot was rejected by nearly all early investors because it started as a marketplace for a niche collectible, Funko Pops. The only VCs who invested were those who knew the founders personally and trusted their ability to expand beyond the initial niche, proving founder conviction can be more crucial than the initial market.
Shopify's evolution shows that initial TAM estimates can be conservative. By strategically expanding into adjacent "horizons" like payments, companies can "add a zero" to their market opportunity. This justifies long-term growth and high valuations, a lesson Bessemer now applies to its portfolio.
A core investment framework is to distinguish between 'pull' companies, where the market organically and virally demands the product, and 'push' companies that have to force their solution onto the market. The former indicates stronger product-market fit and a higher potential for efficient, scalable growth.
When an idea is met with a "wall of skepticism" from investors, it can be a positive sign of a good, non-obvious market. If every VC immediately validates your idea, it's likely too obvious and crowded. Proving early skeptics wrong with traction is a powerful path to building a defensible business.
When evaluating revolutionary ideas, traditional Total Addressable Market (TAM) analysis is useless. VCs should instead bet on founders with a "world-bending vision" capable of inducing a new market, not just capturing an existing one. Have the humility to admit you can't predict market size and instead back the visionary founder.
A common misconception is that market size is fixed. However, as investor Alex Rampell notes, the market for a product executed exceptionally well can be orders of magnitude larger than for a merely adequate solution. Superior execution doesn't just capture a market; it dramatically expands it.