The US and USSR, despite being adversaries, collaborated to prevent nuclear proliferation to rogue actors. A similar model can be applied to AI. The US and China share an interest in preventing powerful open-weight models from being used for cyber-attacks or bio-terrorism by third parties, creating a foundation for a safety dialogue.

To prevent a reckless race, a proposed solution is a U.S.-China treaty to govern the resources needed for frontier AI. This would involve tracking and monitoring advanced AI chips in data centers and imposing a verifiable cap on the computational power used for any single training run.

The same governments pushing AI competition for a strategic edge may be forced into cooperation. As AI democratizes access to catastrophic weapons (CBRN), the national security risk will become so great that even rival superpowers will have a mutual incentive to create verifiable safety treaties.

The most realistic path for US-China AI talks involves creating protocols to prevent models falling into the hands of terrorists or criminal groups. Cooperation on preventing state-level cyberattacks is unlikely, as both sides assume the other's intelligence agencies will use AI for espionage.

Tech leaders state they would support an AI development pause if competitors, especially China, also agreed. This is a strategic PR move, as they know a global consensus is unachievable. It allows them to appear responsible about AI safety without any actual risk of having to slow down progress.

Contrary to fears that U.S. regulation creates a competitive disadvantage, China's track record, like crushing its AI companion sector over risk concerns, indicates Beijing will also implement strong AI safety rules. This creates potential for U.S.-China alignment on safety.

The unstated reason AI labs are appealing to the US government to "pace" development is that only a government can handle the necessary international diplomacy. The labs recognize that any meaningful slowdown is futile without China's participation, making the letter an implicit request for the US to initiate a global, coordinated agreement.

Despite intense technological competition, both the U.S. and China face a common threat from non-state actors like terrorist or criminal groups acquiring powerful AI models. This shared vulnerability presents a potential opportunity for cooperation on AI regulation and safeguards, even amid broader strategic rivalry.

A pragmatic starting point for U.S.-China AI cooperation is to agree on verifiable red lines for proliferating dangerous dual-use capabilities, such as advanced cyberattack tools. This addresses a mutual security interest and builds the institutional trust and processes needed for more ambitious agreements on superintelligence.