There is no point of AI dominance where a nation becomes immune to safety risks. For both the U.S. and China, every advance in model capability inherently increases national vulnerability to misuse, accidents, or attacks, linking the two concepts inextricably.

While U.S. advocates for AI cooperation with China often feel they are in a marginalized minority fighting a hawkish narrative, their counterparts in China feel their position is mainstream. Chinese academia, industry, and think tanks broadly view international governance collaboration as a priority, not just an acceptable option.

To prevent a reckless race, a proposed solution is a U.S.-China treaty to govern the resources needed for frontier AI. This would involve tracking and monitoring advanced AI chips in data centers and imposing a verifiable cap on the computational power used for any single training run.

The notion that tough export controls deny diplomatic space for AI risk discussions with China is a "mental model error." The Biden administration proved it's possible to compete vigorously by implementing chip restrictions while simultaneously engaging in government-to-government dialogue on AI-enabled nuclear risk.

A purely cooperative approach to AI arms control with China is unlikely to work due to their inherent skepticism. A more effective realpolitik strategy may be for the U.S. to advance its AI capabilities so far and fast that China feels compelled to negotiate out of self-interest to avoid being hopelessly behind.

The same governments pushing AI competition for a strategic edge may be forced into cooperation. As AI democratizes access to catastrophic weapons (CBRN), the national security risk will become so great that even rival superpowers will have a mutual incentive to create verifiable safety treaties.

Despite intense technological competition, both the U.S. and China face a common threat from non-state actors like terrorist or criminal groups acquiring powerful AI models. This shared vulnerability presents a potential opportunity for cooperation on AI regulation and safeguards, even amid broader strategic rivalry.

Framing the US-China AI dynamic as a zero-sum race is inaccurate. The reality is a complex 'coopetition' where both sides compete, cooperate on research, and actively co-opt each other's open-weight models to accelerate their own development, creating deep interdependencies.

International AI treaties, particularly with nations like China, are unlikely to hold based on trust alone. A stable agreement requires a mutually-assured-destruction-style dynamic, meaning the U.S. must develop and signal credible offensive capabilities to deter cheating.