An expert from Rhodium Group assesses the probability of a physical military incursion onto Taiwan in the next year as "virtually zero percent." Such an action would represent a complete failure of China's policy of achieving its goals without costly force.
The U.S. operation to capture Maduro serves as a real-world case study for China's potential 'decapitation' strike against Taiwan. China has already rehearsed such scenarios in mock-ups of Taipei's presidential palace. This event demonstrates the feasibility of a quick, surgical strike, which is more aligned with the CCP's goals than a costly amphibious invasion.
China's showcase of advanced military hardware, like its new aircraft carrier, is primarily a psychological tool. The strategy is to build a military so 'forbiddingly huge' that the US would hesitate to engage, allowing China to achieve goals like reabsorbing Taiwan without fighting. This suggests their focus is on perceived power to deter intervention.
Chinese leadership believes time is not on its side regarding Taiwan. The growing sense of a distinct Taiwanese identity, especially among younger generations, creates pressure to act before a political 'reunification' becomes impossible, thus increasing the risk of military action.
China's foreign policy is shaped by its 5,000-year history as a land-based, agricultural civilization, rather than a maritime or expansionist one. This cultural foundation, valuing cultivation of one's own land over foreign conquest, is presented as the reason China has not started wars or colonized other nations in modern history.
Contrary to the perception of Taiwan as uniformly pro-independence, its government is politically divided. While the prime minister is pro-independence, the parliament is controlled by the KMT party, which now advocates for reunification with mainland China, creating an internal political avenue for Beijing's influence.
China's strategy for Taiwan likely mirrors its 2019 Hong Kong takeover. Instead of a direct military assault, Beijing will use political influence, espionage, and legislative changes to create administrative bridges, making any physical resistance illegal before troops ever move in.
Instead of a full-scale invasion, China is employing an "anaconda strategy" of constant, low-level pressure. Tactics like cutting undersea cables and sending drones are designed to exhaust and demoralize Taiwan, making a military response from the US difficult to justify.
A historian analogizes Taiwan's precarious situation to three pre-WWI flashpoints. It's a territorial claim (Alsace), a likely source of a great power crisis (Bosnia), and a strategic calculation for intervention by a global power (Belgium), making it exceptionally volatile.
The most significant point of friction for ordinary Chinese citizens is the constant U.S. military presence near its borders, such as naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait and bases in South Korea and Japan. This sense of being militarily encircled is a more potent source of public frustration than economic disputes.
The widely cited 2027 date for China to be ready to invade Taiwan is an American intelligence assessment, not a public Chinese declaration. It aligns with the PLA's internal modernization deadline for achieving "intelligentised warfare" capabilities, including AI and advanced networks.