The most significant point of friction for ordinary Chinese citizens is the constant U.S. military presence near its borders, such as naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait and bases in South Korea and Japan. This sense of being militarily encircled is a more potent source of public frustration than economic disputes.
The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
Unlike the US's focus on quarterly results and election cycles, China's leadership operates on a civilizational timescale. From their perspective, the US is a recent phenomenon, and losing the US market is an acceptable short-term cost in a much longer game of survival and dominance. This fundamental difference in strategic thinking is often missed.
China's showcase of advanced military hardware, like its new aircraft carrier, is primarily a psychological tool. The strategy is to build a military so 'forbiddingly huge' that the US would hesitate to engage, allowing China to achieve goals like reabsorbing Taiwan without fighting. This suggests their focus is on perceived power to deter intervention.
The core driver of a 'Thucydides Trap' conflict is the psychological distress experienced by the ruling power. For the U.S., the challenge to its identity as '#1' creates a disorienting fear and paranoia, making it prone to miscalculation, independent of actual military or economic shifts.
Unlike the old Cold War with Russia, the U.S. and China's deep economic interdependence prevents open conflict. The current "Rice War" is like water polo: while business and diplomacy occur on the surface, a covert intelligence and influence war rages underneath.
Contrary to media reports, the South China Sea is not a critical strategic asset for China. The sea is surrounded by hostile powers like Vietnam and the Philippines, making it impossible for China to project naval power. Unless China conquers the Vietnamese coast, its man-made islands are useless.
China embraces economic globalization, crediting it for lifting 800 million from poverty. However, it explicitly rejects the "militarized globalization" represented by security pacts like AUKUS or NATO expansion. This differentiates its approach from the Western model, which often intertwines economic integration with shared security and political values.
China's strategy for Taiwan likely mirrors its 2019 Hong Kong takeover. Instead of a direct military assault, Beijing will use political influence, espionage, and legislative changes to create administrative bridges, making any physical resistance illegal before troops ever move in.
Rather than being a problem, public criticism of the military serves a vital function. It forces politicians and leaders to rigorously test their hypotheses and ethics, preventing a descent into an unchecked, aggressive "Team America world police" mentality.
President Xi Jinping used a phone call with President Trump not just for bilateral issues, but to strategically signal displeasure with Japan's hawkish stance on Taiwan. This "shadow play" diplomacy shows China leveraging its relationship with the U.S. to indirectly manage and warn other nations, making the U.S. a channel for its geopolitical messaging.