A flood of capital into private credit has dramatically increased competition, causing the yield spread over public markets to shrink from 3-4% to less than 1%. This compression raises serious questions about whether investors are still being adequately compensated for illiquidity risk.

A significant amount of capital is earmarked in funds designed to deploy only when credit spreads widen past a specific threshold (e.g., 650 bps). This creates a powerful, self-reflexive floor, causing spreads to snap back quickly after a spike and preventing sustained market dislocations.

The massive amount of cash in money market funds isn't from investors selling equities. Instead, it's a direct result of high government interest payments creating a 'cash bubble.' This capital is likely to be forced into risk assets as rates decline, providing significant future fuel for the market.

With corporate credit spreads at historically narrow levels, investors are not being compensated for the inherent risk. In Richard Bernstein's career, spreads have only been this tight three previous times, each preceding a major credit crisis or market scare (late 1990s, mid-2000s, 2021-22). This suggests a poor entry point for credit.

While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.

The market is focused on potential rate cuts, but the true opportunity for credit investors is in the numerous corporate and real estate capital structures designed for a zero-rate world. These are unsustainable at today's normalized rates, meaning the full impact of past hikes is still unfolding.

While currently unattractive, a future, inevitable credit spread widening event (e.g., IG to 165-185 bps, HY to 600-800 bps) will kick off a five-to-ten-year 'golden age' for credit, where corporate bond returns could rival or even outperform equity markets.

Buying opportunities from market dislocations now last for weeks, not months. A massive $7 trillion in money market funds is waiting to be deployed, causing dips to rebound with unprecedented speed. This environment demands faster, more tactical investment decisions.

Contrary to intuition, a gradual pace of Fed rate cuts is often preferable for credit markets. It signals a stable economy, whereas aggressive cuts typically coincide with significant economic deterioration, which hurts credit performance despite the monetary stimulus.