A flood of capital into private credit has dramatically increased competition, causing the yield spread over public markets to shrink from 3-4% to less than 1%. This compression raises serious questions about whether investors are still being adequately compensated for illiquidity risk.

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The yield premium for private credit has shrunk, meaning investors are no longer adequately compensated for the additional illiquidity, concentration, and credit risk they assume. Publicly traded high-yield bonds and bank loans now offer comparable returns with better diversification and liquidity, questioning the rationale for allocating to private credit.

The primary threat to the high-yield market isn't a wave of corporate defaults, but rather a reversion of the compressed risk premium that investors demand. This premium has been historically low, and a return to normal levels presents a significant valuation risk, even if fundamentals remain stable.

Companies are willing to pay a 150-200 basis point premium for private credit to gain a strategic partner who provides bespoke financing, governance, and expertise for complex needs like carve-outs. This partnership value proposition distinguishes it from transactional public markets.

Private credit generates a 200 basis point excess spread over public markets by eliminating intermediaries. This 'farm-to-table' model connects investor capital directly to borrowers, providing customized solutions while capturing value that would otherwise be lost to syndication fees.

While the US private credit market is saturated, Europe's middle-market offers higher spreads (north of 600 basis points) and lower leverage. This opportunity is most pronounced in non-sponsor deals, a segment where large banks and public markets are less active, creating a lucrative niche.

While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.

The rise of electronic and portfolio trading has made public credit markets as liquid as equity markets. This 'equitification' has compressed spreads by eliminating the historical illiquidity premium, forcing investors into private markets like private credit to find comparable yield.

Credit spreads are becoming an unreliable economic signal. The shift of issuance to private markets reduces the public supply, while the Federal Reserve's 2020 intervention in corporate debt markets permanently altered how investors price default probability.

The two credit markets are converging, creating a symbiotic relationship beneficial to both borrowers and investors. Instead of competing, they serve different needs, and savvy investors should combine them opportunistically rather than pitting them against each other.

The massive growth of private credit to $1.75 trillion has created an alternative financing source that helps companies avoid default. This liquidity allows them to restructure and later refinance in public markets at lower rates, effectively pushing out the traditional default cycle.

Private Credit's Risk Premium Has Collapsed From 400 to Under 100 Basis Points | RiffOn