A flood of capital into private credit has dramatically increased competition, causing the yield spread over public markets to shrink from 3-4% to less than 1%. This compression raises serious questions about whether investors are still being adequately compensated for illiquidity risk.

In 1935, amidst massive economic uncertainty following the Great Depression, a new AA-rated corporate bond yielded just 70 basis points over Treasurys. This historical precedent, nearly identical to today's spreads, shows that low credit spreads are not necessarily a sign of complacency and can persist even if economic conditions worsen, challenging typical risk-pricing assumptions.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.

History shows that markets with a CAPE ratio above 30 combined with high-yield credit spreads below 3% precede periods of poor returns. This rare and dangerous combination was previously seen in 2000, 2007, and 2019, suggesting extreme caution is warranted for U.S. equities.

Despite tight spreads signaling caution, the current market is not yet cracking. Parallels to 1997-98 and 2005—periods with similar capex, M&A, and interest rates—suggest a stimulative backdrop and a major tech investment cycle (AI) will fuel more corporate aggression before the cycle ultimately ends.

Due to tight credit spreads, Richard Bernstein Advisors (RBA) has taken the unusual step of eliminating all corporate credit exposure from its portfolios. They favor agency mortgage-backed securities, which currently offer a similar or better yield without the associated corporate downgrade or default risk.

While currently unattractive, a future, inevitable credit spread widening event (e.g., IG to 165-185 bps, HY to 600-800 bps) will kick off a five-to-ten-year 'golden age' for credit, where corporate bond returns could rival or even outperform equity markets.

In a market where spreads are tight and technicals prevent sustained sell-offs, making large directional bets is a poor strategy. The best approach is to stay close to benchmarks in terms of overall risk and allocate the risk budget to identifying specific winners and losers through deep, fundamental credit analysis.