Official liquidity measures like Fed balance sheet levels are too slow to be tradable. A better approach is to monitor the symptoms of liquidity conditions in real-time market data. Indicators like SOFR spreads, commercial paper spreads, and unusual yield curve shapes reveal the health of private credit creation.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.

The rise of electronic and portfolio trading has made public credit markets as liquid as equity markets. This 'equitification' has compressed spreads by eliminating the historical illiquidity premium, forcing investors into private markets like private credit to find comparable yield.

A primary market risk is a sudden stop in the AI investment cycle. While this would clearly pressure equities, it could counter-intuitively benefit investment-grade credit by reducing new bond issuance—the main factor forecast to widen spreads.

Credit spreads are becoming an unreliable economic signal. The shift of issuance to private markets reduces the public supply, while the Federal Reserve's 2020 intervention in corporate debt markets permanently altered how investors price default probability.

The expected wave of M&A and LBOs has not materialized, leaving the deal pipeline thin. This lack of new debt supply provides a strong supportive backdrop for credit spreads, allowing the market to absorb geopolitical volatility more easily than fundamentals would otherwise suggest.

In today's hyper-financialized economy, central banks no longer need to actually buy assets to stop a crisis. The mere announcement of their willingness to act, like the Fed's 2020 corporate bond facility, is enough to restore market confidence as traders front-run the intervention.

Enormous government borrowing is absorbing so much capital that it's crowding out corporate debt issuance, particularly for smaller businesses. This lack of new corporate supply leads to ironically tight credit spreads for large borrowers. This dynamic mirrors the intense concentration seen in public equity markets.