The epicenter of a tech boom is rarely the new technology itself. Instead, capital floods into adjacent, understandable sectors. The dot-com bubble wasn't about software but a massive telecom infrastructure bubble, fueled by debt financing for tangible assets like fiber and buildings.

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Speculative manias, like the AI boom, function like collective hallucinations. The overwhelming belief in future demand becomes self-fulfilling, attracting capital that builds tangible infrastructure (e.g., data centers, fiber optic cables) long before cash flows appear, often leaving lasting value even after the bubble bursts.

Major tech companies are investing in their own customers, creating a self-reinforcing loop of capital that inflates demand and valuations. This dangerous practice mirrors the vendor financing tactics of the dot-com era (e.g., Nortel), which led to a systemic collapse when external capital eventually dried up.

The current AI spending spree by tech giants is historically reminiscent of the railroad and fiber-optic bubbles. These eras saw massive, redundant capital investment based on technological promise, which ultimately led to a crash when it became clear customers weren't willing to pay for the resulting products.

History shows pioneers who fund massive infrastructure shifts, like railroads or the early internet, frequently lose their investment. The real profits are captured later by companies that build services on top of the now-established, de-risked platform.

Major investment cycles like railroads and the internet didn't cause credit weakness because the technology failed, but because capacity was built far ahead of demand. This overbuilding crushed investment returns. The current AI cycle is different because strong, underlying demand is so far keeping pace with new capacity.

During the dot-com crash, application-layer companies like Pets.com went to zero, while infrastructure providers like Intel and Cisco survived. The lesson for AI investors is to focus on the underlying "picks and shovels"—compute, chips, and data centers—rather than consumer-facing apps that may become obsolete.

The current AI infrastructure build-out is structurally safer than the late-90s telecom boom. Today's spending is driven by highly-rated, cash-rich hyperscalers, whereas the telecom boom was fueled by highly leveraged, barely investment-grade companies, creating a wider and safer distribution of risk today.

The current AI spending frenzy uniquely merges elements from all major historical bubbles—real estate (data centers), technology, loose credit, and a government backstop—making a soft landing improbable. This convergence of risk factors is unprecedented.

Beyond its original meaning of refining data, the "data is the new oil" metaphor now aptly describes the tech industry's capital structure. Tech is adopting a massive, trillion-dollar debt model, similar to the oil and gas industry, to finance its infrastructure boom.

Howard Marks distinguishes between two bubble types. "Mean reversion" bubbles (e.g., subprime mortgages) create no lasting value. In contrast, "inflection bubbles" (e.g., railroads, internet, AI) fund the necessary, often money-losing, infrastructure that accelerates technological progress for society, even as they destroy investor wealth.