Not all great businesses are suitable for venture capital. A 1,500-year-old Japanese carpentry firm is a fantastic business, but it lacks the exponential growth and massive scalability that define a VC-investable company. Founders must know the difference.

Over-diligencing for well-rounded perfection is a mistake. The best companies rarely excel in every area initially. Instead, investors should identify the one "spike"—the single dimension where the company is 5-10x better than anyone else—as this is the true indicator of outlier potential, rather than looking for a company that is A+ across the board.

In both VC and public markets, the most sought-after deals are often overpriced. Significant alpha can be found in companies ignored by the mainstream, like the company XPEL, which had to list on a Canadian venture exchange because US VCs passed on it and became a 500-bagger.

Even professional venture capitalists struggle to predict their breakout hits. Morgan Housel notes that at his fund, the companies that became their biggest winners were not the ones they initially expected to succeed, while their 'obvious' bets often failed.

Ben Horowitz states a common VC mistake is over-indexing on a startup's weaknesses. The better investment is a team that is unequivocally the best at a single, critical thing. Being "pretty good" at everything is a red flag, as greatness in one area is what drives extraordinary outcomes.

A common mistake in venture capital is investing too early based on founder pedigree or gut feel, which is akin to 'shooting in the dark'. A more disciplined private equity approach waits for companies to establish repeatable, business-driven key performance metrics before committing capital, reducing portfolio variance.

The hardest transition from entrepreneur to investor is curbing the instinct to solve problems and imagine "what could be." The best venture deals aren't about fixing a company but finding teams already on a trajectory to succeed, then helping change the slope of that success line on the margin.

The pursuit of a "diamond in the rough" is an investor ego trap. Andreessen argues that great companies are obvious "diamonds" that attract widespread interest. A deal that seems undiscovered is often "in the rough" for a good reason, like a flawed structure or a hyper-disagreeable founder who has alienated other firms.

In fast-moving sectors, the investable options can seem to improve every few days, creating a dilemma for VCs: invest now or wait for a better team? The solution is to assume dozens of teams are working on any rational idea and focus on choosing the best one you can find now, rather than waiting indefinitely.