A Series A company's valuation isn't based on current financials. Instead, it reflects the purchase of an 'out-of-the-money call option'—a bet that the company could become immensely valuable. The goal is for this option to eventually expire 'in the money,' generating venture returns.
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Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.
The memo details how investors rationalize enormous funding rounds for pre-product startups. By focusing on a colossal potential outcome (e.g., a $1 trillion valuation) and assuming even a minuscule probability (e.g., 0.1%), the calculated expected value can justify the investment, compelling participation despite the overwhelming odds of failure.
Unlike Private Equity or public markets, venture is maximally forgiving of high entry valuations. The potential for exponential growth (high variance) means a breakout success can still generate massive returns, even if the initial price was wrong, explaining the industry's tolerance for seemingly irrational valuations.
Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.
The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.
Redpoint's early-growth fund concentrates on Series B deals, entering after product-market fit is established but before explosive growth becomes apparent in the metrics. The strategy is to invest "a half step before something becomes obvious in the numbers," capturing value at a critical turning point.
AI companies raise subsequent rounds so quickly that little is de-risked between seed and Series B, yet valuations skyrocket. This dynamic forces large funds, which traditionally wait for traction, to compete at the earliest inception stage to secure a stake before prices become untenable for the risk involved.
Venture capitalists may value a solid $15M revenue company at zero. Their model is not built on backing good businesses, but on funding 'upside options'—companies with the potential for explosive, outlier growth, even if they are currently unprofitable.
The ideal period for venture investment—after a company is known but before its success becomes obvious—has compressed drastically. VCs are now forced to choose between investing in acute uncertainty or paying massive, near-public valuations.
With trillion-dollar IPOs likely, the old model where early VCs win by having later-stage VCs "mark up" their deals is obsolete. The new math dictates that significant ownership in a category winner is immensely valuable at any stage, fundamentally changing investment strategy for the entire industry.
