A population can be habituated to war through gradual escalation. By starting with seemingly small, contained "lightning strikes," each subsequent step feels less shocking. This incremental approach can lead a nation into a major conflict without a single decisive moment of public debate or consent.

Unlike wars where a nation is attacked first (e.g., Pearl Harbor), "wars of choice" lack the sustained public support needed for a long conflict. The aggressor has a political weak point, which adversaries exploit to win a war of attrition, not battlefield victories.

The entire framework of nuclear deterrence relies on the assumption that all parties wish to avoid their own annihilation. This logic collapses when facing a jihadist regime that views death in holy war as a direct path to paradise, making it an absolute imperative to prevent them from acquiring nukes.

The literal meaning of jihad as 'struggle' extends beyond warfare to include non-violent methods to advance Islam's influence. These include 'jihad of the tongue' (propaganda), financial influence, and demographic competition ('baby jihad').

Intelligence agencies' biggest concern is "blowback"—the severe diplomatic, economic, and intelligence-sharing penalties from allies if a covert operation is exposed. The risk of alienating a critical ally, such as the U.S., far outweighs any potential gain from an operation like a political assassination on their soil.

Sam Harris argues one can simultaneously believe that toppling the Iranian regime is a correct moral objective, while also recognizing that the Trump administration's execution is dangerously inept. This separates the strategic goal from the tactical and political leadership carrying it out.

Harris suggests that the most effective voices against radical Islam are ex-Muslims from those cultures. They possess deep cultural knowledge and are immune to identity-based dismissals like 'Islamophobia'. Therefore, Western policy should focus on empowering these individuals to lead a reformation from within.

Countering the "blowback" theory, Harris argues that the perception of jihadist success—like the rise of the ISIS caliphate—is what truly inspires new recruits. Therefore, ensuring jihadists are consistently and publicly defeated is the most effective counter-recruitment strategy.

A government can achieve the political will for war without staging a direct false flag. A more subtle and deniable tactic is to knowingly lower defenses, making an enemy attack possible. This creates the same casus belli while avoiding direct culpability.