A former CIA operative suggests that government secrecy is frequently a tool to hide administrative incompetence, premature announcements, or procedural errors, rather than to cover up nefarious, large-scale conspiracies. This perspective reframes public distrust from calculated malice to bureaucratic failure.
Agencies like Mossad strategically allow or even promote media about their successful operations (e.g., films like "Munich"). This acts as information warfare, shaping a global perception of their omnipotence. This cultivated mystique serves as a powerful deterrent, even if their true capabilities are more limited.
The human brain resists ambiguity and seeks closure. When a significant, factual event occurs but is followed by a lack of official information (often for legitimate investigative reasons), this creates an "open loop." People will naturally invent narratives to fill that void, giving rise to conspiracy theories.
Intelligence agencies' biggest concern is "blowback"—the severe diplomatic, economic, and intelligence-sharing penalties from allies if a covert operation is exposed. The risk of alienating a critical ally, such as the U.S., far outweighs any potential gain from an operation like a political assassination on their soil.
The most logical explanation for Epstein's unusual legal leniency is that he was a Clandestine Informant (CI). Law enforcement agencies grant immunity to criminals like Epstein in exchange for access to a network of higher-value targets, such as corrupt politicians or foreign agents, whom they consider a greater threat to national security.
Applying Hanlon's Razor ("Don't attribute to malice what is adequately explained by incompetence"), it's more probable that a political figure was killed due to security failures than a complex, flawless conspiracy by a foreign state. Incompetence is statistically more common than a perfectly executed secret plot.
A two-step analytical method to vet information: First, distinguish objective (multi-source, verifiable) facts from subjective (opinion-based) claims. Second, assess claims on a matrix of probability and source reliability. A low-reliability source making an improbable claim, like many conspiracy theories, should be considered highly unlikely.
An administration has no incentive to fully resolve a major public scandal because its unresolved nature makes it a perfect "red herring." It can be used repeatedly to distract the public and media from current policy failures or other damaging news, making perpetual ambiguity more politically useful than transparency.