Relying on an adversarial nation like China for manufacturing, especially for critical technologies, places a country in a "horrifyingly weak position." In the event of a war, the inability to produce essential goods is a fatal flaw that renders a nation powerless.
Politicians predictably declare initiatives for domestic production of critical goods like munitions or rare earths when dependencies are exposed. However, these declarations rarely translate into effective action, suggesting we must learn to manage economic entanglement as a form of mutual deterrence rather than wish it away.
From China's perspective, producing more than it needs and exporting at cutthroat prices is a strategic tool, not an economic problem. This form of industrial warfare is designed to weaken other nations' manufacturing bases, prioritizing geopolitical goals over profit.
The strategic competition with China is often viewed through a high-tech military lens, but its true power lies in dominating the low-tech supply chain. China can cripple other economies by simply withholding basic components like nuts, bolts, and screws, proving that industrial basics are a key geopolitical weapon.
The US won World War II largely due to its unparalleled manufacturing capacity. Today, that strategic advantage has been ceded to China. In a potential conflict, the US would face an adversary that mirrors its own historical strength, creating a critical national security vulnerability.
While headlines focus on advanced chips, China’s real leverage comes from its strategic control over less glamorous but essential upstream inputs like rare earths and magnets. It has even banned the export of magnet-making technology, creating critical, hard-to-solve bottlenecks for Western manufacturing.
The Under Secretary of War defines the current "1938 moment" not as an imminent war, but as a critical juncture for rebuilding the domestic industrial base. The focus is on reversing decades of outsourcing critical components like minerals and pharmaceuticals, which created strategic vulnerabilities now deemed unacceptable for national security.
Supply chain vulnerability isn't just about individual parts. The real test is whether a complex defense system, like a directed energy weapon, can be manufactured *entirely* from components sourced within the U.S. or from unshakeable allies. Currently, this is not possible, representing a critical security gap.
The U.S. reactively chases news headlines (like rare earths) without a rigorous framework to identify its most critical dependencies. Policymakers have not prioritized whether to secure wartime supply chains or mitigate China's leverage over consumer goods that could spark domestic political crises.
The U.S. military's power is no longer backed by a robust domestic industrial base. Decades of offshoring have made it dependent on rivals like China for critical minerals and manufacturing. This means the country can no longer sustain a prolonged conflict, a reality its defense planners ignore.
Anduril's co-founder argues America's atrophied manufacturing base is a critical national security vulnerability. The ultimate strategic advantage isn't a single advanced weapon, but the ability to mass-produce "tens of thousands of things" efficiently. Re-industrializing is therefore a core pillar of modern defense strategy.