The US military action against Iran lacks a clear off-ramp or stated goal, violating the Powell Doctrine. This ambiguity between objectives like "regime change" and other aims creates strategic confusion and risks prolonged engagement without a defined victory condition.

The bombing campaign, aimed at regime change, could be counterproductive. Prior to the conflict, Iran's regime was seen as unpopular and frail, potentially heading for collapse or moderation. The external attack risks creating a rally-round-the-flag effect, allowing the regime to consolidate power where mere survival becomes a victory.

While currently aligned, the long-term interests of Israel and the US in a war with Iran could split. Israel seeks total elimination of Iran's missile threat, implying a prolonged conflict. The US, however, may have less tolerance for a drawn-out war due to concerns about its impact on global energy prices and the economy.

The administration aggressively talks about regime change, making promises to the Iranian opposition. However, the military actions and follow-up policies are not scaled to achieve this ambitious goal, creating a strategic disconnect that undermines the operation's credibility and clarity of purpose.

The specific targeting choices in the initial Iran strikes—leadership, navy warships, and military infrastructure—suggest the primary goal is economic control, specifically securing the Strait of Hormuz. Had the true objective been nuclear deterrence, the focus would have been on destroying nuclear facilities, which was not the case.

Defining success as an ambitious, all-or-nothing outcome like 'regime change' is a critical mistake. Instead, administrations should set clear, measurable military objectives, such as degrading missile capabilities or naval threats. This allows them to define success, declare victory, and create a clear off-ramp for military campaigns.

The US is moving from a global deterrence posture to concentrating massive force for specific operations, as seen with Iran. This strategy denudes other theaters of critical assets, creating windows of opportunity for adversaries like China while allies are left exposed.

Iran's strategy isn't a quick military victory but a war of attrition. By accepting a long timeline and inflicting small but consistent damage, it aims to erode US domestic support for the war, especially in an election year, and outlast the current administration.

The hope that airstrikes can catalyze a popular uprising for regime change is historically unfounded. Unlike in Afghanistan or Libya where local ground forces existed, there is no organized army on the ground in Iran to capitalize on air power, making a decapitation strategy highly unlikely to succeed.