While AI drove 2025 CapEx, a broader business investment recovery depends on a cyclical upswing in demand. This requires consumer spending to broaden beyond the wealthy, directly linking corporate investment growth to the improved financial health and real income growth of low- and middle-income households.

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While there's a popular narrative about a US manufacturing resurgence, the massive capital spending on AI contradicts it. By consuming a huge portion of available capital and accounting for half of GDP growth, the AI boom drives up the cost of capital for all non-AI sectors, making it harder for manufacturing and other startups to get funded.

Consumer spending resilience is not broad-based. It's largely driven by the top 10% of income earners (making over $275k), who now account for almost 50% of total spending. This is the only cohort whose spending has outpaced inflation since the pandemic, making the wider economy highly sensitive to their behavior.

While aggregate gross investment numbers look strong due to the AI boom, this hides weakness in classic cyclical sectors like residential investment, construction, and industrial equipment. This divergence creates opportunities for trades like long tech/short energy, which capitalizes on the two-speed economy.

While high-income spending remains stable, the next wave of consumption growth will stem from a recovery in the middle-income segment. This rebound will be driven by stabilizing factors like reduced policy uncertainty and neutral monetary policy, not a major labor market acceleration.

Despite headline economic growth, the bottom 80% of U.S. households have seen their spending power stagnate since before the pandemic. Their spending has grown at exactly the rate of inflation, meaning their real consumption hasn't increased. This data explains the widespread public dissatisfaction with the economy.

Despite a still-growing labor market, real wage growth has slowed to "stall speed." This lagged effect on middle and lower-income households is the primary driver for the projected 2-percentage-point drop in real consumption growth for Q4 and Q1.

Real consumer spending is up only 1% year-to-date (non-annualized), which annualizes to a weak 1.5%. This is a significant slowdown from the typical 2-2.5% growth in previous years, indicating that consumers are substantially pulling back their expenditures.

Further U.S. economic acceleration is unlikely as underlying growth drivers are strained. Economic models suggest consumer consumption is 'overshooting its fundamentals,' indicating it's unsustainable. Concurrently, the incremental growth from AI-related capital expenditure is becoming harder to achieve, suggesting a potential plateau for this key investment area.

Aggregate US consumer strength is misleadingly propped up by the top 40% of upper-income households, whose spending is buoyed by appreciating assets. This masks weaknesses among lower- and middle-income groups who are more affected by inflation, creating a narrowly driven economic expansion.

The economy's apparent strength is misleadingly concentrated. Growth hinges on AI-related capital expenditures and spending by the top 20% of households. This narrow base makes the economy fragile and vulnerable to a single shock in these specific areas, as there is little diversity to absorb a downturn.

US Non-AI Business Investment Hinges on the Spending Power of Lower-Income Consumers | RiffOn