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The extreme power law in venture means a tiny fraction of firms drive nearly all returns. An LP who over-diversifies across 50-70 managers is essentially buying the index and guaranteeing average performance. To achieve top-tier returns, LPs must concentrate capital in the few proven, top-performing firms.
Venture capital returns follow a power law distribution, meaning a fund's entire performance is often determined by one or two massive outliers. New investors should prioritize finding companies with grand-slam potential over building a portfolio of modest, base-hit successes, as it's the big wins that drive everything.
Data reveals an extreme power law in venture capital, with less than 1% of firms consistently achieving top-tier 3x net returns over two decades. This highlights the intense concentration of returns and the necessity for LPs to gain access to a select few managers to succeed.
As venture capital firms scale to manage billions, their business model shifts from the 'artisan craft' of early-stage investing to an industrial process of asset gathering. This makes it difficult to focus on small, early opportunities and will likely result in IRRs that are no better than the industry average.
Acknowledging venture capital's power-law returns makes winner-picking nearly impossible. Vested's quantitative model doesn't try. Instead, it identifies the top quintile of all startups to create a high-potential "pond." The strategy is then to achieve broad diversification within this pre-qualified group, ensuring they capture the eventual outliers.
Most VC funds fail to generate meaningful returns for LPs. Only the top quartile consistently delivers performance that justifies the risk. The asset class as a whole underperforms, challenging the idea that broader retail access would be beneficial.
The venture capital industry is not a balanced market where returns are evenly distributed. Returns are concentrated among a handful of elite firms. For most other investors and LPs, the model is unsustainable due to high entry valuations and a low probability of success, leading to wasted capital.
VC outcomes aren't a bell curve; a tiny fraction of investments deliver exponential returns covering all losses. This 'power law' dynamic means VCs must hunt for massive outliers, not just 'good' companies. Thiel only invests in startups with the potential to return his whole fund.
The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.
AI startups' explosive growth ($1M to $100M ARR in 2 years) will make venture's power law even more extreme. LPs may need a new evaluation model, underwriting VCs across "bundles of three funds" where they expect two modest performers (e.g., 1.5x) and one massive outlier (10x) to drive overall returns.
Most investors expect a normal distribution of returns, but reality shows a few big winners are responsible for the bulk of portfolio growth. This is a core concept in venture capital that applies equally to public market investing, where 1-3 investments can generate over half of all returns.