The subpar NBA viewing experience on Vision Pro, with jarring camera cuts, is not a technical flaw. It's a calculated business strategy by leagues to differentiate immersive "broadcast rights" from highly lucrative "presence rights" (courtside seats), preventing new technology from cannibalizing existing revenue.

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Contrary to expectations that hardware should get lighter, Apple's Vision Pro refresh actually increased weight. The strategic tradeoff was to improve wearability for long sessions (like an NBA game) by enhancing comfort and balance through a redesigned band, prioritizing user experience over a single spec.

Despite analysts viewing live sports as a prime use case for the Apple Vision Pro, Apple's F1 partnership announcement omits plans for immersive 3D or spatial content. This failure to connect a major content acquisition with its new flagship hardware represents a significant missed opportunity to drive hardware adoption.

The current strategy of offering immersive sports experiences only to in-market fans on devices like the Apple Vision Pro is flawed. The real opportunity is an inverse model: providing the VR experience exclusively to out-of-market fans who cannot physically attend, creating a new revenue stream without cannibalizing ticket sales.

Leagues maximize revenue by selling broadcast rights in multiple packages to different streamers. This forces fans to subscribe to several expensive services to follow a single team, costing upwards of $650 per season. This poor, costly user experience makes piracy a rational economic choice for many fans, regardless of income.

Luckey argues analysts misunderstand the Vision Pro's strategy. At $3,500, it's not a mass-market product. Its goal is to make VR highly desirable and aspirational. By solving the "want" problem first, Apple primes the market for future, lower-cost versions, avoiding the trap of making a cheap product nobody wants.

Ben Thompson argues Apple's core mistake with Vision Pro sports is treating it like TV, with jarring camera cuts and pre-game shows. The killer app is simple: an unedited, live feed from a single courtside camera that delivers a pure sense of presence, which would also solve Apple's content scalability problem.

Apple's media strategy follows a playbook: first, produce a popular fictional show about a sport (e.g., "Ted Lasso"), building an audience and cultural relevance. Then, acquire the expensive broadcasting rights for the real league (e.g., MLS), ensuring a ready-made viewership for their investment.

Unlike the early iPhone era, developers are hesitant to build for new hardware like the Apple Vision Pro without a proven audience. They now expect platform creators to de-risk development by first demonstrating a massive user base, shifting the market-building burden entirely onto the hardware maker.

Apple's failure to provide immersive, 3D spatial video for its new F1 partnership is a major missed opportunity for the Vision Pro. Live sports are a primary driver for VR/AR adoption. Offering only a standard 2D broadcast in a virtual environment fails to create a differentiated experience that would justify the hardware's cost for hardcore fans and drive platform adoption.

Apple likely overproduces Vision Pro sports content due to contract negotiations, not a lack of vision. Leagues like the NBA protect lucrative "presence rights" (e.g., courtside seats) and are unwilling to sell a perfect, substitutive VR experience that could cannibalize their most expensive tickets.

The NBA Deliberately Degrades the Apple Vision Pro Experience to Protect High-Value "Presence Rights" | RiffOn