Co-investing offers 'structural alpha.' By participating in average deals with average private equity managers but without paying management fees or carried interest, an LP's returns are mathematically lifted to a top-quartile level. This inherent advantage exists before any deal-specific underwriting.
General Partners (GPs) prioritize speed and certainty when allocating co-investment opportunities. LPs who build a reputation for fast, reliable decision-making can punch far above their weight, gaining access to deals disproportionate to their fund commitment size.
To democratize venture capital, ARK created a fund that eliminates the traditional 20% carried interest (a share of profits). Instead, it charges a flat 2.75% management fee. This structure aims to give retail investors with as little as $500 direct access to premier private company cap tables without the performance fees that typically benefit fund managers disproportionately.
For LPs, the primary benefit of pre-fund co-investments with emerging managers isn't just financial returns. It's a critical diligence tool to observe intangible qualities, such as a sponsor's discipline to abandon a flawed deal, which strongly correlates with long-term success.
To participate in highly competitive late-stage deals, some VCs organize SPVs without management fees or carry. While not directly profitable, this helps the startup fundraise, strengthens the relationship, protects the VC's original investment, and signals access to LPs for future funds.
The size of a co-investment opportunity is an underappreciated factor in its alpha potential. Large, widely syndicated deals often represent market beta, while true alpha is more frequently found in smaller deals from small- to mid-cap funds where unique value-creation opportunities are more prevalent.
When assessing a co-investment, LPs should request data on employee participation. Deals where the PE firm's own staff invest their personal capital tend to be the better-performing ones, serving as a powerful, internal signal of conviction that goes beyond the official pitch.
A proposed university fund model involves automatically exercising pro-rata rights in its startups only after a top-tier VC firm leads a round, effectively creating a top-decile portfolio by leveraging external due diligence at near-zero cost.
Superior returns can come from a firm's structure, not just its stock picks. By designing incentive systems and processes that eliminate 'alpha drags'—like short-term pressures, misaligned compensation, and herd behavior—a firm can create a durable, structural competitive advantage that boosts performance.
To overcome LP objections to layered fees, fund-of-funds must deliver outsized returns. This is achieved not by diversification, but through extreme concentration. By investing 90% of capital into just 10-13 high-potential "risk-on" funds, the model is structured to outperform, making the additional management fee and carry worthwhile for the end investor.
In a world of high valuations and compressed returns, LPs can no longer be passive allocators. They must build capabilities for real-time portfolio management, actively buying and selling fund positions based on data-driven views of relative value and liquidity. This active management is a new source of LP alpha.