The U.S. market's high prices create the large profit pool necessary to fund risky drug development. If the U.S. adopted price negotiation like other countries, the global incentive for pharmaceutical innovation would shrink, resulting in fewer new drugs being developed worldwide.

Initial panic over the MFN drug pricing scheme was based on pegging U.S. prices to the lowest in the industrialized world. The actual proposal is far less drastic, targeting the second-lowest price among a small cohort of high-income nations (G7 plus Denmark and Switzerland), a significantly less onerous benchmark.

Early-year fears of existential threats from policies like Most Favored Nation (MFN) drug pricing have faded. V.C. Bruce Booth notes investors now see these as political wins for the administration that don't fundamentally alter revenue forecasts, reflecting a desensitization to political risk.

While MFN pricing is seen as a major threat, it could have an unexpected positive effect. It would force companies launching new drugs to establish a GDP-adjusted global price from the start, ending the current system where the U.S. effectively subsidizes lower prices elsewhere.

Major pharmaceutical companies are now willing to deploy the "nuclear option" of pulling planned R&D investments to express displeasure with national drug pricing policies. This tactic, seen in the UK, represents a direct and aggressive strategy to pressure governments into accepting higher prices for innovative medicines.

To fix the R&D funding imbalance, the CEO proposes a 'one fair price' system. A drug would have one US price with no rebates, and a price in other developed nations would be indexed to their GDP per capita.

Historically a Democratic focus, drug pricing policy has been co-opted by Republicans, making it a bipartisan political issue. This alignment creates a stable policy overhang and sustained uncertainty around pricing and innovation, deterring generalist investors regardless of which party is in power.

To achieve Most Favored Nation (MFN) drug pricing, the administration paired HHS negotiators with the Commerce Secretary. While one team negotiated terms, the Commerce Secretary acted as the "hammer," holding a credible threat of crippling tariffs over pharmaceutical companies that primarily manufacture overseas. This forced compliance.

A centrist solution to high drug prices involves combining ideas from both political aisles. Oliver Libby suggests allowing Medicare to negotiate prices (a left-leaning idea) while also extending patent life for drug companies (a right-leaning idea), thus lowering costs without killing the incentive for innovation.