Contrary to the popular debate, venture is primarily an access game, not a picking game. The core challenge is building a system to see a high volume of exceptional founders and then win the allocation. Once that is achieved, selecting which ones to back becomes straightforward.
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To win the best pre-seed deals, investors should engage high-potential talent during their 'founder curious' phase, long before a formal fundraise. The real competition is guiding them toward conviction on their own timeline, not battling other VCs for a term sheet later.
Traditional VC reliance on "differentiated networks" is obsolete as data sources and professional networks are now commodities. To compete, modern VCs must replace this outdated advantage with proprietary intelligence platforms that algorithmically source deals and identify the right signals for where to focus time.
Acknowledging venture capital's power-law returns makes winner-picking nearly impossible. Vested's quantitative model doesn't try. Instead, it identifies the top quintile of all startups to create a high-potential "pond." The strategy is then to achieve broad diversification within this pre-qualified group, ensuring they capture the eventual outliers.
Horowitz claims a VC firm's ability to win access to the most sought-after deals is more critical to success than its genius for picking winners. A strong brand that ensures access to competitive rounds can generate top-tier returns even with average picking ability.
Achieving a top-decile graduation rate requires stacking multiple, distinct filters. Start with an algorithmic screen on founders to beat the market. Add a filter for co-investing with top VCs to improve further. The final layer is your own qualitative judgment to reach the target performance.
Horowitz claims that winning competitive deals is a much larger component of VC success than simply picking the right companies. A firm with a brand and platform that can consistently win the best deals will automatically generate top-tier returns, even with average picking ability. This attracts the best pickers over time, creating a flywheel.
Competing to be a founder's "first call" is a crowded, zero-sum game. A more effective strategy is to be the "second call"—the specialist a founder turns to for a specific, difficult problem after consulting their lead investor. This positioning is more scalable, collaborative, and allows for differentiated value-add.
Strict investment theses (e.g., "only second-time founders") are merely guidelines. The high volume of meetings required in venture capital provides the essential context and pattern recognition needed to identify exceptional outliers that defy rigid heuristics.
The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.
Small, dedicated venture funds compete against large, price-insensitive firms by sourcing founders *before* they become mainstream. They find an edge in niche, high-signal communities like the Thiel Fellowship interviewing committee or curated groups of technical talent. This allows them to identify and invest in elite founders at inception, avoiding bidding wars and market noise.
