Major shaping legislation on China, from the CHIPS Act to sanctions, often originates in Congress. Congressional action creates durable policy that outlasts fleeting presidential administrations, providing guardrails and tools for the executive branch.
It's a common error to conflate the CHIPS Act and the October 2022 chip controls. The CHIPS Act was a legislative effort for domestic manufacturing resilience. The executive export controls were a separate national security policy focused on denying China access to high-end compute for military applications.
The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.
The U.S.-China Commission was established by a skeptical Congress during China's WTO accession not only to monitor China, but also to oversee the U.S. executive branch's handling of the relationship. It focuses on long-term strategic issues rather than immediate crises.
Key departments like Commerce have conflicting mandates. The Commerce Secretary's primary goal is to promote U.S. business abroad, which structurally disincentivizes them from implementing tough export controls that could harm those same businesses, thus undermining national security objectives.
The U.S.-China Commission proposes consolidating disparate economic tools like export controls into a single entity. This would prevent critical decisions from languishing at mid-levels within conflicted departments and create a single forcing function for action, reducing the need for constant NSC intervention.
Introducing legislation in Congress isn't always about immediate passage. Bills frequently function as messaging vehicles to build awareness and support for an idea over several congressional terms. This gradual process allows for the evolution of major policy, like the creation of new government agencies, which rarely happens in a single two-year cycle.
The latest U.S. National Security Strategy drops confrontational rhetoric about China as an ideological threat, instead framing the relationship around economic rivalry and rebalancing. This shift prioritizes tangible deals over promoting American values globally, marking a departure from Reagan-era foreign policy.
Anticipating that independence from China will be a long-term, bipartisan US policy goal, Rivian intentionally designed its new R2 supply chain to be U.S.-centric. This strategic planning aims to align the business with persistent geopolitical trends, rather than just reacting to current tariffs.
U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors, intended to slow China, have instead galvanized its domestic industry. The restrictions accelerated China's existing push for self-sufficiency, forcing local companies to innovate with less advanced chips and develop their own GPU and manufacturing capabilities, diminishing the policy's long-term effectiveness.
Despite expected legislative gridlock, investors should focus on the executive branch. The president's most impactful market tools, such as tariff policy and deregulation via executive agencies, do not require congressional approval. Significant policy shifts can therefore occur even when Congress is divided and inactive.