U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors, intended to slow China, have instead galvanized its domestic industry. The restrictions accelerated China's existing push for self-sufficiency, forcing local companies to innovate with less advanced chips and develop their own GPU and manufacturing capabilities, diminishing the policy's long-term effectiveness.
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Instead of a total ban, a more strategic approach is to "slow ball" an adversary like China by providing them with just enough technology. This keeps them dependent on foreign suppliers and disincentivizes the massive state investment required to develop their own superior, independent solutions.
The massive IPO success of More Threads, founded by a former NVIDIA executive, highlights immense domestic investor enthusiasm for creating a homegrown alternative to NVIDIA, backed by unprecedented government capital and political will.
A nation's advantage is its "intelligent capital stock": its total GPU compute power multiplied by the quality of its AI models. This explains the US restricting GPU sales to China, which counters by excelling in open-source models to close the gap.
The US-China tech rivalry spans four arenas: creating technology, applying it, installing infrastructure, and self-sufficiency. While the U.S. excels at creating foundational tech like AI frameworks and semiconductors, China is leading in its practical application (e.g., robotics), installing digital infrastructure globally, and achieving resource independence.
Contrary to their intent, U.S. export controls on AI chips have backfired. Instead of crippling China's AI development, the restrictions provided the necessary incentive for China to aggressively invest in and accelerate its own semiconductor industry, potentially eroding the U.S.'s long-term competitive advantage.
China is explicitly subsidizing domestic semiconductor firms through its National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund. This state-backed capital is the key driver behind its policy to achieve technological independence and replace foreign companies like NVIDIA.
China is compensating for its deficit in cutting-edge semiconductors by pursuing an asymmetric strategy. It focuses on massive 'superclusters' of less advanced domestic chips and creating hyper-efficient, open-source AI models. This approach prioritizes widespread, low-cost adoption over chasing the absolute peak of performance like the US.
While the West may lead in AI models, China's key strategic advantage is its ability to 'embody' AI in hardware. Decades of de-industrialization in the U.S. have left a gap, while China's manufacturing dominance allows it to integrate AI into cars, drones, and robots at a scale the West cannot currently match.
Beyond raw materials, China's national ambition is to achieve near-total self-sufficiency. The prevailing mood is that there is "nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to." This philosophy of aggressive import substitution signals a fundamental break with the logic of reciprocal global trade.
From 2001 onwards, while the U.S. was militarily and economically distracted by the War on Terror, China executed a long-term strategy. It focused on acquiring Western technology and building indigenous capabilities in AI, telecom, and robotics, effectively creating a rival global economic system.
