Unlike nuclear energy or the space race where government was the primary funder, AI development is almost exclusively led by the private sector. This creates a novel challenge for national security agencies trying to adopt and integrate the technology.
The most potent criticism of the U.S. chip controls wasn't flawed strategy, but the chronic underfunding and limited capacity of agencies like the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to effectively enforce complex export bans against determined adversaries.
A former White House advisor noted that the core theories behind major policies are often well-established. The true challenge and critical skill is navigating the complex government process—the interagency meetings and procedures—to translate an idea into official action.
Securing a lead in computing power over rivals is not a victory in itself; it is a temporary advantage. If that time isn't used to master national security adoption and win global markets, the lead becomes worthless. Victory is not guaranteed by simply having more data centers.
A small team in the Biden White House successfully implemented crucial export controls on semiconductor technology before ChatGPT's release made AI a mainstream obsession, allowing them to act proactively rather than reactively.
The 2020 research formalizing AI's "scaling laws" was the key turning point for policymakers. It provided mathematical proof that AI capabilities scaled predictably with computing power, solidifying the conviction that compute, not data, was the critical resource to control in U.S.-China competition.
The long-term trajectory for AI in cybersecurity might heavily favor defenders. If AI-powered vulnerability scanners become powerful enough to be integrated into coding environments, they could prevent insecure code from ever being deployed, creating a "defense-dominant" world.
It's a common error to conflate the CHIPS Act and the October 2022 chip controls. The CHIPS Act was a legislative effort for domestic manufacturing resilience. The executive export controls were a separate national security policy focused on denying China access to high-end compute for military applications.
The critical national security risk for the U.S. isn't failing to invent frontier AI, but failing to integrate it. Like the French who invented the tank but lost to Germany's superior "Blitzkrieg" doctrine, the U.S. could lose its lead through slow operational adoption by its military and intelligence agencies.