For D1 Capital, the primary risk in China isn't economic but political. The government's ability to arbitrarily influence resource allocation, punish successful companies, and eliminate entire sectors without due process creates an unacceptable level of uncertainty for capital allocators, regardless of how cheap valuations become.

To counter the economic threat from China's state-directed capitalism, the U.S. is ironically being forced to adopt similar strategies. This involves greater government intervention in capital allocation and industrial policy, representing a convergence of economic models rather than a clear victory for free-market capitalism.

China operates as a high-agency "engineering state" that executes relentlessly on large-scale projects. In contrast, America's deliberative, litigious society often leads to endless delays and failures on major infrastructure goals like the California high-speed rail, highlighting a fundamental difference in state capacity and approach.

China's "engineering state" mindset extends beyond physical projects to social engineering. The Communist Party treats its own people as a resource to be moved or molded—whether displacing a million for a dam or enforcing the one-child policy—viewing society as just another material to achieve its objectives.

A nation's leadership class shapes its priorities. China's government, heavily populated by engineers, excels at long-term, systematic infrastructure and technology projects. The US, dominated by lawyers, often gets mired in litigation and short-term cycles, hindering large-scale execution.

China's economic structure, which funnels state-backed capital into sectors like EVs, inherently creates overinvestment and excess capacity. This distorted cost of capital leads to hyper-competitive industries, making it difficult for even successful companies to generate predictable, growing returns for shareholders.

The widely reported collapse of China's housing market is not an organic crisis but a state-directed reallocation of capital. By instructing banks to prioritize industrial capacity over mortgages, the government is deliberately shifting funds away from a speculative real estate bubble and into strategic sectors like microchips to counter US sanctions and build self-sufficiency.

Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.

In trying to compete, the U.S. is mirroring China's protectionism and industrial policy. This is a strategic error, as the U.S. political system lacks the ability to centrally direct resources and execute long-term industrial strategy as effectively as China's state-controlled economy.