Private VCs with board seats operate deterministically, using their influence to 'make sure' a drug succeeds. Public fund managers operate probabilistically, accepting imperfect information in exchange for liquidity. They must calculate the odds of success rather than trying to directly shape the outcome.
The 'classic' VC model hunts for unproven talent in niche areas. The now-dominant 'super compounder' model argues the biggest market inefficiency is underestimating the best companies. This justifies investing in obvious winners at any price, believing that outlier returns will cover the high entry cost.
The memo details how investors rationalize enormous funding rounds for pre-product startups. By focusing on a colossal potential outcome (e.g., a $1 trillion valuation) and assuming even a minuscule probability (e.g., 0.1%), the calculated expected value can justify the investment, compelling participation despite the overwhelming odds of failure.
A common mistake in venture capital is investing too early based on founder pedigree or gut feel, which is akin to 'shooting in the dark'. A more disciplined private equity approach waits for companies to establish repeatable, business-driven key performance metrics before committing capital, reducing portfolio variance.
Astute biotech leaders leverage the tension between public financing and strategic pharma partnerships. When public markets are down, pursue pharma deals as a better source of capital. Conversely, use the threat of a public offering to negotiate more favorable terms in pharma deals, treating them as interchangeable capital sources.
Large, contrarian investments feel like career risk to partners in a traditional VC firm, leading to bureaucracy and diluted conviction. Founder-led firms with small, centralized decision-making teams can operate with more decisiveness, enabling them to make the bold, potentially firm-defining bets that consensus-driven partnerships would avoid.
'Gifted TVPI' comes from consensus deals with pedigreed founders who easily raise follow-on capital. 'Earned TVPI' comes from non-consensus founders whose strong metrics eventually prove out the investment. A healthy early-stage portfolio requires a deliberate balance of both.
Moving from science to investing requires a critical mindset shift. Science seeks objective, repeatable truths, while investing involves making judgments about an unknowable future. Successful investors must use quantitative models as guides for judgment, not as sources of definitive answers.
Unlike operating companies that seek consistency, VC firms hunt for outliers. This requires a 'stewardship' model that empowers outlier talent with autonomy. A traditional, top-down CEO model that enforces uniformity would stifle the very contrarian thinking necessary for venture success. The job is to enable, not manage.
A fund manager's fiduciary duty incentivizes them to trade potentially higher, more volatile returns for guaranteed, quicker multiples (e.g., a 3.5x over a 7x). Unlike a personal investor who can accept high dispersion (big winners, total losses), a GP must prioritize returning capital to LPs like pensions and endowments.
Lior Susan highlights the biggest mental hurdle for former operators becoming VCs: internalizing the power law. Operators are builders wired to fix problems and believe they can turn any situation around. In VC, success is driven by a few massive outliers, requiring focus on winners, not on fixing every company.