The term "middle market" is too broad for risk assessment. KKR's analysis indicates that default risk and performance dispersion are not uniform. Instead, they will be most pronounced in the lower, smaller end of the middle market, while the larger companies in the upper-middle market remain more resilient.

Large banks have offloaded riskier loans to private credit, which is now more accessible to retail investors. According to Crossmark's Victoria Fernandez, this concentration of risk in a less transparent market, where "cockroaches" may be hiding, is a primary systemic concern.

Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The US corporate market is 75% financed by capital markets, while Europe's is ~80% bank-financed. This structural inversion means Europe is undergoing a long-term, multi-decade shift toward institutional lending, creating a sustained tailwind for private credit growth that is far from mature.

Private credit allows investors to act like chefs—deeply involved from ingredient sourcing (diligence) to final creation (structuring). Liquid market investors are like food critics, limited to analyzing the finished product with restricted access to information, which increases risk.

Recent "canary in the coal mine" cases like First Brands, often blamed on private markets, were not PE-owned and were primarily financed in liquid markets. In fact, it was private credit firms pushing for deeper diligence that exposed the issues, strengthening the argument that private credit offers a safer way to access the asset class.

A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.

Recent credit failures and frauds are not 'systemic' risks that threaten the entire financial system's structure. Instead, they are 'systematic'—a regularly recurring behavioral phenomenon. Good times predictably lead to imprudent lending, creating clusters of defaults. The problem is human behavior, not a fundamental flaw in the market itself.

The two credit markets are converging, creating a symbiotic relationship beneficial to both borrowers and investors. Instead of competing, they serve different needs, and savvy investors should combine them opportunistically rather than pitting them against each other.