During the uncertain regulatory review of its Adobe acquisition, Figma's leadership kept its "foot on the gas." Because an acquirer cannot direct a company's activities pre-close, Figma continued executing its independent roadmap, ensuring it remained strong whether the deal succeeded or failed.
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CEO Dylan Field combats organizational slowness by interrogating project timelines. He seeks to understand the underlying assumptions and separate actual work from "well-intentionally added" padding. This forces teams to reason from first principles and justify the true time required, preventing unnecessary delays.
A product roadmap's value is in the planning process and aligning the team on a vision, not in rigidly adhering to a delivery schedule. The co-founder of Artist argues that becoming a feature factory focused on checking boxes off a roadmap is a dangerous trap that distracts from solving real customer problems.
Initial data suggested the market for design tools was too small to build a large business. Figma's founders bet on the trend that design was becoming a key business differentiator, which would force the market to expand. They focused on building for the trend, not the existing TAM.
Gumroad's CEO credits their rapid development to his role as a solo decision-maker. This structure eliminates the lengthy processes of gaining internal buy-in and creating extensive documentation (PRDs, specs) common in larger organizations, which are often more about alignment than execution.
Vercel created a separate business unit for its AI tool, V0, because it targets a different audience (PMs, designers) and needed to operate with extreme speed, unburdened by the decision-making processes of the larger 700-person parent company.
Early user research showed designers did not want a collaborative, multiplayer tool. However, Figma's web-based architecture made a single-player experience technically terrible (e.g., tabs constantly reloading). They were forced by the technology to build multiplayer functionality, which ultimately became their key differentiator, proving the platform's needs can override initial user requests.
Contrary to conventional startup advice, Figma's founders began with a fascination for a technology (WebGL) and then searched for a problem to solve. This technology-first approach, a hammer looking for a nail, led them to explore various failed ideas like face-swapping before eventually landing on collaborative design tools.
Figma learned that removing issues preventing users from adopting the product was as important as adding new features. They systematically tackled these blockers—often table stakes features—and saw a direct, measurable improvement in retention and activation after fixing each one.
Despite Figma's massive success, Dylan Field considers their long pre-monetization period a mistake. The company started in 2012 but didn't earn its first revenue until 2017. He strongly advises founders against this path, emphasizing the need to ship and learn from the market more quickly.
After the Adobe deal collapsed, Figma launched "Detach," letting any employee leave with severance. This filtered for commitment, reset the team for a "hard-charging startup" mentality, and provided a graceful exit for those who were tired or had joined expecting to work at Adobe.