Early user research showed designers did not want a collaborative, multiplayer tool. However, Figma's web-based architecture made a single-player experience technically terrible (e.g., tabs constantly reloading). They were forced by the technology to build multiplayer functionality, which ultimately became their key differentiator, proving the platform's needs can override initial user requests.
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Don't just collect feedback from all users equally. Identify and listen closely to the few "visionary users" who intuitively grasp what's next. Their detailed feedback can serve as a powerful validation and even a blueprint for your long-term product strategy.
Initial data suggested the market for design tools was too small to build a large business. Figma's founders bet on the trend that design was becoming a key business differentiator, which would force the market to expand. They focused on building for the trend, not the existing TAM.
Intentionally create open-ended, flexible products. Observe how power users "abuse" them for unintended purposes. This "latent demand" reveals valuable, pre-validated opportunities for new features or products, as seen with Facebook's Marketplace and Dating features.
Early versions of Figma failed to gain traction because designers, its target users, fundamentally didn't trust the tool's own subpar visual design. This meta-problem highlights that for a tool to be credible to its expert users, its own execution must embody the principles it espouses. A redesign was the key to unlocking user trust and adoption.
Beyond a limited market and raising too much capital, a core reason for Evernote's decline was its foundational architecture. Built as a private, single-player tool, it was technically and conceptually unable to pivot to the collaborative, multiplayer experience that competitors like Notion later capitalized on.
Contrary to conventional startup advice, Figma's founders began with a fascination for a technology (WebGL) and then searched for a problem to solve. This technology-first approach, a hammer looking for a nail, led them to explore various failed ideas like face-swapping before eventually landing on collaborative design tools.
When FigJam felt soulless a month before launch, the team made a controversial decision to differentiate it by making it fun. This seemed frivolous but was strategically crucial for encouraging participation and creative expression in brainstorming sessions, especially during the remote-work era.
Figma learned that removing issues preventing users from adopting the product was as important as adding new features. They systematically tackled these blockers—often table stakes features—and saw a direct, measurable improvement in retention and activation after fixing each one.
Historically, resource-intensive prototyping (requiring designers and tools like Figma) was reserved for major features. AI tools reduce prototype creation time to minutes, allowing PMs to de-risk even minor features with user testing and solution discovery, improving the entire product's success rate.
Figma's success as a general-purpose design tool (useful for posters, floor plans, etc.) is precisely what makes it suboptimal for software development. Its WebGL-based canvas is fundamentally disconnected from the DOM, creating a "pretty picture" that requires a separate, costly engineering effort to translate into code.
