The universal jamming of GPS in conflict zones like Ukraine has rendered modern, GPS-reliant drones ineffective. This has reset the baseline level of drone autonomy to what it was two decades ago, creating an urgent need for alternative navigation systems that can operate without satellite signals.

Tenet Industries' CEO asserts that "last mile" targeting for drones is a solved problem from the 1960s. The real innovation and demand lie in enabling drones to navigate autonomously for 20+ kilometers in GPS-jammed environments, a much harder and more critical problem to solve.

The war in Ukraine demonstrated that advanced U.S. munitions, such as GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shells, can be rendered ineffective by the electronic warfare capabilities of adversaries like Russia. This reveals a critical vulnerability in the U.S. arsenal, as many key systems rely heavily on GPS for guidance.

The intense signal jamming by Russia in Ukraine makes remotely piloted drones ineffective in the final phase of an attack. This has created a tactical necessity for drones that can autonomously complete their mission after losing their data link, accelerating the development of practical, on-board AI for target engagement.

A significant amount of 'BS' in the drone market involves capabilities that demo well but fail in combat. Drone swarming is a prime example, as most demos rely on stable GPS, which is non-existent on a real battlefield due to jamming. This creates a false sense of technological readiness.

Ukraine is pioneering 'last mile autonomy' not as a strategic push for automation, but as a tactical necessity. When Russia jams the data link to a drone, the system can autonomously complete the final leg of its attack on a pre-identified target, countering electronic warfare.

Radio-frequency control links inevitably break when drones fly long distances or dive below the canopy into heavy jamming environments. Successful strike drones require onboard edge compute running target-recognition models so pilots can designate targets outside electronic warfare bubbles and allow the drone to finish the attack independently.

Domestic lab testing cannot replicate the blistering speed of adaptation occurring in modern conflicts. Metz notes that drone startups must test their hardware in operationally relevant, high-threat environments like Ukraine to expose design flaws and ensure their technology can iterate rapidly enough to remain relevant.

A significant tactical evolution in the Ukraine war is the use of drones controlled by fiber-optic wires up to 60 kilometers long. This makes them immune to the radio-frequency jamming that disables conventional drones, creating a new layer of complexity and littering the battlefield with webs of optical filament.