The relentless cycle of preparing for deployment focused all training on immediate counter-insurgency needs. This prevented experimentation with new tech and warfare concepts, creating a generation of commanders who struggle to adapt to new threats.

The military fails to effectively transfer knowledge between rotating units in a conflict zone. Incoming units often discard their predecessors' experience, believing they can do better, thus repeating the same errors and failing to build on crucial, hard-won lessons.

The policy of rotating commanders on one-year tours was a critical strategic flaw in Afghanistan. Each new commander arrived believing they had the "recipe for success" and would change the strategy, resulting in a series of disconnected, short-term plans that prevented long-term progress.

The argument that sailors "signed up for this" overlooks the severe mental strain of indefinitely extended deployments. Constantly pushing back return dates creates an emotional breaking point that drives experienced personnel to leave the service, worsening fleet-wide skill gaps.

After decades of military overextension in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, there's a danger the American public will dismiss the unique challenge from China as 'there they go again.' This fatigue makes it difficult to mobilize resources for deterrence against the 'military-industrial complex' narrative.

The Global War on Terror consumed resources, forcing services like the Navy and Air Force to pursue ambitious tech transformations on tight budgets. This led to disasters like the Littoral Combat Ship and F-35, from which they haven't fully recovered.

Twenty years of focusing on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the Army's core competencies for conventional warfare to degrade significantly. For example, short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities were so gutted that the Army had to rebuild the entire skill set from scratch, as there were no experienced NCOs left to train new soldiers.

The current maintenance backlog means that in a crisis, the Navy would have to surge ships that are not fully mission-capable. These vessels are more likely to break down or be damaged in combat, creating a cascading effect of failures that deepens the maintenance hole and reduces combat effectiveness.

Driscoll's departure is a symptom of a larger problem: constant meddling from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, capricious firings of respected generals, and a force breaking under a 25-year op tempo. His resignation signifies a deep-seated crisis in Army leadership and morale.