The U.S. military is unparalleled in "decisive operations" (Phase 3) but consistently fails at long-term stabilization (Phase 4). To succeed, strategy should be reverse-engineered from the desired post-conflict state, rather than focusing solely on winning the initial battle.

The military fails to effectively transfer knowledge between rotating units in a conflict zone. Incoming units often discard their predecessors' experience, believing they can do better, thus repeating the same errors and failing to build on crucial, hard-won lessons.

The policy of rotating commanders on one-year tours was a critical strategic flaw in Afghanistan. Each new commander arrived believing they had the "recipe for success" and would change the strategy, resulting in a series of disconnected, short-term plans that prevented long-term progress.

Military analyst Andrew Exum predicted that the war in Ukraine would become 'the best excuse the US army ever found to never say the words Iraq and Afghanistan again.' The institution is rapidly pivoting to large-scale combat operations, dismantling specialized units like the Asymmetric Warfare Group and discarding hard-won counterinsurgency knowledge.

Germany's massive defense budget isn't immediately going toward cutting-edge technology like drones and AI. Years of neglect have so depleted the Bundeswehr that it must first spend a fortune replenishing basic, legacy systems like tanks and jets. This highlights a critical challenge for neglected militaries: innovation can only happen after the foundational, conventional capabilities are restored.

The preference for using expensive standoff weapons stems from a command level that is both highly risk-averse and has, to some degree, forgotten how to synchronize complex operations like Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). This avoids pilot risk but prevents the use of more plentiful, cheaper munitions.

Critical capabilities like mine-clearing helicopters and army engineer support were moved to the reserves after the Cold War. This means in a sudden conflict, these essential units can take a month or more to mobilize and deploy, creating a critical gap that active-duty forces cannot fill.

The US Army's extensive counterinsurgency experience from the Global War on Terror is largely irrelevant in modern peer-level conflicts. Forces like the Ukrainians and Russians now possess far more relevant and recent combat experience, particularly regarding drone warfare and large-scale conventional operations.

To avoid casualties, the U.S. military became increasingly reliant on heavy, road-bound vehicles and heavily fortified bases. This made forces less flexible and unable to access areas that earlier, more nimble units reached with pickup trucks and ATVs. The focus on protection ultimately overextended forces and ceded initiative to the enemy.