The federal government's performance management system is broken by grade inflation, with over 80% of employees receiving top ratings. This makes it impossible to differentiate performance, leading to bonuses being spread thinly across the board and failing to meaningfully incentivize top talent or address underperformance.
Exceptional people in flawed systems will produce subpar results. Before focusing on individual performance, leaders must ensure the underlying systems are reliable and resilient. As shown by the Southwest Airlines software meltdown, blaming employees for systemic failures masks the root cause and prevents meaningful improvement.
Startups aim for non-linear outcomes yet often default to conventional, linear compensation bands. To properly incentivize breakthrough performance, founders must reward employees who have a disproportionate impact with equally disproportionate pay, breaking from standard practices.
Focusing on individual performance metrics can be counterproductive. As seen in the "super chicken" experiment, top individual performers often succeed by suppressing others. This lowers team collaboration and harms long-term group output, which can be up to 160% more productive than a group of siloed high-achievers.
Tying SDR promotions to time-in-seat fosters stagnation. Instead, create a clear, multi-level roadmap where advancement is based solely on hitting performance thresholds. This model rewards high-achievers, provides constant motivation, and gives reps control over their career trajectory.
While a single performance-based layoff can target underperformance, repeated rounds signal a systemic failure in leadership. It suggests managers are unable to hire, coach, or provide feedback effectively, making it a management problem rather than an individual employee issue.
According to Goodhart's Law, when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. If you incentivize employees on AI-driven metrics like 'emails sent,' they will optimize for the number, not quality, corrupting the data and giving false signals of productivity.
Setting rigid targets incentivizes employees to present favorable numbers, even subconsciously. This "performance theater" discourages them from investigating negative results, which are often the source of valuable learning. The muscle for detective work atrophies, and real problems remain hidden beneath good-looking metrics.
Despite average test scores on a consistent exam dropping by 10 points over 20 years, 60% of all grades at Harvard are now A's, up from 25%. This trend suggests a significant devaluation of academic credentials, where grades no longer accurately reflect student mastery.
The federal government's rigid GS pay schedule traditionally links compensation to degrees and years of experience, barring skilled but non-traditionally qualified individuals from senior roles. The OPM is now eliminating these requirements to enable a merit-based system where skill, not credentials, dictates pay and position.
Teams often self-limit output because they know overperformance will simply raise future targets to unsustainable levels. This "prison of expectations" incentivizes predictable mediocrity over breakthrough results, as employees actively manage goals to avoid future failure.