The biggest risk for a late-stage private company is a growth slowdown. This forces a valuation model shift from a high multiple on future growth to a much lower multiple on current cash flow—a painful transition when you can't exit to the public markets.

Private Equity investors often misunderstand the VC model, questioning the lack of deep due diligence. They fail to grasp that VCs operate on power laws, needing just one investment to return the entire fund, making the potential for exponential growth the only metric that truly matters.

The memo details how investors rationalize enormous funding rounds for pre-product startups. By focusing on a colossal potential outcome (e.g., a $1 trillion valuation) and assuming even a minuscule probability (e.g., 0.1%), the calculated expected value can justify the investment, compelling participation despite the overwhelming odds of failure.

Unlike Private Equity or public markets, venture is maximally forgiving of high entry valuations. The potential for exponential growth (high variance) means a breakout success can still generate massive returns, even if the initial price was wrong, explaining the industry's tolerance for seemingly irrational valuations.

Sequoia Capital's Roloff Botha calculates that with ~$250 billion invested into venture capital annually, the industry needs to generate nearly $1 trillion in returns for investors. This translates to a staggering $1.5 trillion in total company exit value every year, a figure that is difficult to imagine materializing consistently.

The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.

Venture capitalists may value a solid $15M revenue company at zero. Their model is not built on backing good businesses, but on funding 'upside options'—companies with the potential for explosive, outlier growth, even if they are currently unprofitable.

The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.

With trillion-dollar IPOs likely, the old model where early VCs win by having later-stage VCs "mark up" their deals is obsolete. The new math dictates that significant ownership in a category winner is immensely valuable at any stage, fundamentally changing investment strategy for the entire industry.