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Even as the CHIPS Act brings leading-edge manufacturing to the US, a key vulnerability remains: the chips must be sent back to Taiwan for advanced packaging. This process, essential for high-performance computing, leaves the supply chain exposed.
TSMC's new Arizona factory can produce NVIDIA's advanced chips, but this doesn't solve US supply chain dependency. The chips must still be shipped back to Taiwan for the critical advanced packaging stage, meaning the primary bottleneck remains firmly in Asia despite onshoring manufacturing.
It's a common error to conflate the CHIPS Act and the October 2022 chip controls. The CHIPS Act was a legislative effort for domestic manufacturing resilience. The executive export controls were a separate national security policy focused on denying China access to high-end compute for military applications.
While TSMC's Arizona expansion has been complex, it's already achieving yields comparable to its Taiwan facilities. An expert believes this success comes at a price, with higher costs likely being a permanent feature of US-based manufacturing.
It's naive to expect private companies to reverse the offshoring of chip manufacturing, a trend they initiated to maximize profits. Pat Gelsinger argues that markets don't price in long-term geopolitical risk, making substantial, long-term government industrial policy essential to bring supply chains back.
While energy supply is a concern, the primary constraint for the AI buildout may be semiconductor fabrication. TSMC, the leading manufacturer, is hesitant to build new fabs to meet the massive demand from hyperscalers, creating a significant bottleneck that could slow down the entire industry.
With 97% of high-end chips and 72% of the global foundry market controlled by Taiwan, specifically TSMC, any disruption—from military blockade to cyberattack—would trigger an 'economic apocalypse.' This massive over-concentration creates a singular, fragile chokepoint with no short-term alternative, threatening the entire global economy.
Beyond financial metrics, the most significant 'tail risk' to the AI boom is the high concentration of advanced semiconductor manufacturing overseas, particularly in Taiwan. A geopolitical conflict could sever the supply of essential hardware, posing a much more fundamental threat to the industry's growth than market volatility or corporate overspending.
Taiwan's TSMC dominates advanced chip manufacturing not only through technical excellence but also its business model. By acting as a pure-play foundry that doesn't compete with its clients (unlike Intel or Samsung), it fostered unique trust and partnerships, making it the central hub of the semiconductor ecosystem and a critical geopolitical asset.
The U.S. focus on building domestic fabrication plants (fabs) is misguided because fabs represent a lower value-added, highly capital-intensive part of the semiconductor value chain. National security and economic strategy would be better served by focusing on downstream activities like testing and packaging, which are closer to the end consumer.
Supply chain vulnerability isn't just about individual parts. The real test is whether a complex defense system, like a directed energy weapon, can be manufactured *entirely* from components sourced within the U.S. or from unshakeable allies. Currently, this is not possible, representing a critical security gap.