After a crisis, regulation is popular. But as memory fades and regulations work, they are increasingly seen as unnecessary hindrances. This amnesia creates a cyclical push for deregulation that sows the seeds of the next crisis.

Related Insights

Most 20th-century nations experienced an "economic apocalypse" (communism, hyperinflation). The US, Canada, and Australia are rare exceptions. This long-term stability has created a cultural blind spot, making the American population uniquely unprepared for systemic financial crises.

According to PIMCO's CIO, post-crisis regulation heavily targets the last failure point (e.g., banks and consumer lending post-GFC). This makes previously regulated sectors safer while risk migrates to areas that escaped scrutiny, like today's non-financial corporate credit market.

Former RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan points to a historical pattern preceding every major financial crisis: a U-shape in monetary policy. An extended period of easy money builds up risk, and the subsequent tightening phase triggers the collapse. This framework helps identify periods of heightened systemic vulnerability.

Market stability is an evolutionary process where each crisis acts as a learning event. The 2008 crash taught policymakers how to respond with tools like credit facilities, enabling a much faster, more effective response to the COVID-19 shock. Crises are not just failures but necessary reps that improve systemic resilience.

Markets react sharply to clear, quantifiable events like tariff announcements but are poor early-warning signals for gradual, harder-to-price risks like the erosion of democratic norms. This creates a dangerous complacency among investors and policymakers.

Core components of today's financial landscape, including FDIC insurance, Social Security, and even the 30-year mortgage, were not products of gradual evolution. They were specific policies created rapidly out of the financial ashes of the Great Depression, demonstrating how systemic shocks can accelerate fundamental structural reforms.

Investors try to apply lessons from past market cycles, but this collective awareness changes their behavior. This creates a self-reinforcing loop that alters timelines and dynamics, ensuring history only rhymes, not repeats.

Policies designed to suppress market volatility create a fragile stability. The underlying risk doesn't disappear; it transmutes into social and political polarization, driven by wealth inequality. This social unrest is a leading indicator of future market instability.

Contrary to the popular belief that markets are forgetful, the speaker argues they are more traumatized by crashes (like 2008) than buoyed by bull runs. The constant crisis predictions and "Big Short" memes on social media demonstrate a powerful, persistent memory for loss over gain.

Citing a lesson from former Goldman Sachs CFO David Viniar, Alan Waxman argues the root cause of financial crises isn't bad credit, but liquidity crunches from mismatched assets and liabilities (e.g., funding long-term assets with short-term debt). This pattern repeats as investors collectively forget the lesson over time.