According to PIMCO's CIO, post-crisis regulation heavily targets the last failure point (e.g., banks and consumer lending post-GFC). This makes previously regulated sectors safer while risk migrates to areas that escaped scrutiny, like today's non-financial corporate credit market.
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Large banks have offloaded riskier loans to private credit, which is now more accessible to retail investors. According to Crossmark's Victoria Fernandez, this concentration of risk in a less transparent market, where "cockroaches" may be hiding, is a primary systemic concern.
Market stability is an evolutionary process where each crisis acts as a learning event. The 2008 crash taught policymakers how to respond with tools like credit facilities, enabling a much faster, more effective response to the COVID-19 shock. Crises are not just failures but necessary reps that improve systemic resilience.
The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.
Historically, lower-quality credit cycles involved periods of high returns followed by giving all the gains back in a downturn. Post-GFC, the absence of a sustained recession has allowed private credit to outperform high-quality bonds by 7% annually without the typical "give it all back" phase, masking latent risks.
Despite headlines blaming private credit for failures like First Brands, the vast majority (over 95%) of the exposure lies with banks and in the liquid credit markets. This narrative overlooks the structural advantages and deeper diligence inherent in private deals.
The greatest systemic threat from the booming private credit market isn't excessive leverage but its heavy concentration in technology companies. A significant drop in tech enterprise value multiples could trigger a widespread event, as tech constitutes roughly half of private credit portfolios.
Credit spreads are becoming an unreliable economic signal. The shift of issuance to private markets reduces the public supply, while the Federal Reserve's 2020 intervention in corporate debt markets permanently altered how investors price default probability.
In today's hyper-financialized economy, central banks no longer need to actually buy assets to stop a crisis. The mere announcement of their willingness to act, like the Fed's 2020 corporate bond facility, is enough to restore market confidence as traders front-run the intervention.
For 40 years, falling rates pushed 'safe' bond funds into increasingly risky assets to chase yield. With rates now rising, these mis-categorized portfolios are the most vulnerable part of the financial system. A crisis in credit or sovereign debt is more probable than a stock-market-led crash.
Sectors that have experienced severe distress, like Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), often present compelling opportunities. The crisis forces tighter lending standards and realistic asset repricing. This creates a safer investment environment for new capital, precisely because other investors remain fearful and avoid the sector.