Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.

Drawing from his time at the US Treasury, Amias Gerety explains that recessions are about slowing growth. A financial crisis is a far more dangerous event where fundamental assumptions collapse because assets previously considered safe are suddenly perceived as worthless, causing a "sudden stop" in the economy.

After a decade of zero rates and QE post-2008, the financial system can no longer function without continuous stimulus. Attempts to tighten policy, as seen with the 2018 repo crisis, immediately cause breakdowns, forcing central banks to reverse course and indicating a permanent state of intervention.

The Federal Reserve is tightening policy just as forward-looking inflation indicators are pointing towards a significant decline. This pro-cyclical move, reacting to lagging data from a peak inflation print, is a "classic Fed error" that unnecessarily tightens financial conditions and risks derailing the economy.

Veteran investor Jim Schaefer notes a recurring pattern before recessions: a massive, euphoric movement of capital into a specific area (e.g., telecom in 2001, mortgages in 2008). This over-investment inevitably creates systemic problems. Investors should be wary of any asset class currently experiencing such a large-scale influx.

Widespread credit is the common accelerant in major financial crashes, from 1929's margin loans to 2008's subprime mortgages. This same leverage that fuels rapid growth is also the "match that lights the fire" for catastrophic downturns, with today's AI ecosystem showing similar signs.

Unlike the 2008 crisis, which was concentrated in housing and banking, today's risk is an 'everything bubble.' A decade of cheap money has simultaneously inflated stocks, real estate, crypto, and even collectibles, meaning a collapse would be far broader and more contagious.

The money printing that saved the economy in 2008 and 2020 is no longer as effective. Each crisis requires a larger 'dose' of stimulus for a smaller effect, creating an addiction to artificial liquidity that makes the entire financial system progressively more fragile.

For 40 years, falling rates pushed 'safe' bond funds into increasingly risky assets to chase yield. With rates now rising, these mis-categorized portfolios are the most vulnerable part of the financial system. A crisis in credit or sovereign debt is more probable than a stock-market-led crash.