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Brown says cutting ASML and Tokyo Electron servicing at advanced fabs will not immediately halt production; Chinese contractors and parts may fill some gaps. But advanced subsystems like the light source and stages likely degrade yield and throughput starting around six to twelve months.

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Semiconductor equipment makers like ASML are largely shielded from China-specific export controls. Their business is driven by total global demand for chips, not the location of production. A fab not built in China due to sanctions will simply be built elsewhere, leading to a substitution effect where the equipment sale still occurs.

Analyst Chris Miller argues China's core challenge is manufacturing, as it lacks the advanced lithography tools monopolized by ASML. The US and Taiwan are projected to produce 30 times more quality-adjusted AI chips, a gap unlikely to close soon.

Blocked from buying advanced EUV lithography machines from ASML, China is not just trying to build its own. It's aggressively investing in "leap ahead" technologies like free electron lasers. This strategy aims to bypass the current generation of technology entirely, creating a new competitive front in the semiconductor war.

Brown's modeling assumes China diverts its entire DUV stockpile to advanced fabs and spends all of it on AI chips. Even under that extreme scenario, physics and lithography throughput leave China well below a tenth of US AI chip production through 2035.

Nick Brown says EUV gets the attention, but allowed NXT:1980 DUV immersion systems can support seven-nanometer logic and HBM used in Huawei's Ascend chips. China imported about 90 systems in 2024-25, over $10 billion, nearly two-thirds of ASML's immersion exports.

China will likely struggle to indigenously manufacture commercial DUV immersion lithography tools until the mid-2030s, long after domesticating deposition or etch tools. Because only Japan and the Netherlands produce them, lithography remains the West's most durable geopolitical lever.

Brown ran a scenario where China prototypes a seven-nanometer-equivalent DUV next year, reaches commercial production the year after, and scales 100% annually. Even then, existing stockpile plus indigenous production does not come close to US-allied production if imports are cut off.

Existing export restrictions left older DUV immersion systems unrestricted, allowing China to double its installed base. Halting all DUV tool flows could cap China's domestic chip production at roughly 10 million chips annually, maintaining a massive US compute advantage.

The effectiveness of US export controls on advanced AI chips stems from a deep technological gap. According to China's own projections, it won't be able to domestically produce chips as powerful as those the US is restricting until 2028, creating a significant and lasting strategic advantage for democracies.

Brown and the hosts argue Match Act import bans will not crater China's chip output overnight; effects build over years, especially for item exports. Unlike 2025 tariff shocks or the 50% rule, this slower burn may not trigger acute retaliation.

Servicing bans likely degrade, not stop, China chip output | RiffOn