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Brown's modeling assumes China diverts its entire DUV stockpile to advanced fabs and spends all of it on AI chips. Even under that extreme scenario, physics and lithography throughput leave China well below a tenth of US AI chip production through 2035.

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Analyst Chris Miller argues China's core challenge is manufacturing, as it lacks the advanced lithography tools monopolized by ASML. The US and Taiwan are projected to produce 30 times more quality-adjusted AI chips, a gap unlikely to close soon.

The current 3x annual growth in AI compute is not easily accelerated and may be unsustainable. It is fundamentally constrained by the slowing of Moore's Law (1.4x), the fixed production rate of ASML's EUV machines for new fabs (1.2x), and the near-total absorption of leading-edge wafer capacity from other sectors (1.8x).

China cannot overcome its semiconductor disadvantage by simply applying more energy to its lagging-edge chips. No frontier AI model has been trained on hardware older than 5nm, suggesting leading-edge nodes provide an essential, non-linear advantage in training efficiency that cannot be compensated for with sheer power, a major hurdle for China's AGI ambitions.

Brown says if China keeps importing lithography at its 2024-25 pace and shifts a larger share to AI, the curve bends upward. In that AI-push scenario, China could reach near parity or parity with US chipmaking in about ten years.

Nick Brown says EUV gets the attention, but allowed NXT:1980 DUV immersion systems can support seven-nanometer logic and HBM used in Huawei's Ascend chips. China imported about 90 systems in 2024-25, over $10 billion, nearly two-thirds of ASML's immersion exports.

China will likely struggle to indigenously manufacture commercial DUV immersion lithography tools until the mid-2030s, long after domesticating deposition or etch tools. Because only Japan and the Netherlands produce them, lithography remains the West's most durable geopolitical lever.

Brown ran a scenario where China prototypes a seven-nanometer-equivalent DUV next year, reaches commercial production the year after, and scales 100% annually. Even then, existing stockpile plus indigenous production does not come close to US-allied production if imports are cut off.

By 2030, China is expected to have a fully indigenous DUV lithography supply chain, enabling mass production of chips on older process nodes. However, for the most advanced EUV technology, they will likely only have working prototypes and will still be struggling with the 'production hell' required for high-volume manufacturing.

In 2022, China was adding 30-35% of the world's new AI compute. Due to U.S. export controls, that figure has now plummeted to below 10%. This creates a widening capabilities gap, with China projected to have less than 30 gigawatts of lower-quality compute by 2028.

Existing export restrictions left older DUV immersion systems unrestricted, allowing China to double its installed base. Halting all DUV tool flows could cap China's domestic chip production at roughly 10 million chips annually, maintaining a massive US compute advantage.

China's current DUV stockpile caps AI output below 10% of US | RiffOn