We scan new podcasts and send you the top 5 insights daily.
Nick Brown says EUV gets the attention, but allowed NXT:1980 DUV immersion systems can support seven-nanometer logic and HBM used in Huawei's Ascend chips. China imported about 90 systems in 2024-25, over $10 billion, nearly two-thirds of ASML's immersion exports.
Analyst Chris Miller argues China's core challenge is manufacturing, as it lacks the advanced lithography tools monopolized by ASML. The US and Taiwan are projected to produce 30 times more quality-adjusted AI chips, a gap unlikely to close soon.
Brown says cutting ASML and Tokyo Electron servicing at advanced fabs will not immediately halt production; Chinese contractors and parts may fill some gaps. But advanced subsystems like the light source and stages likely degrade yield and throughput starting around six to twelve months.
Brown says CSET reports show China making inroads in etch, deposition, and CMP, but it still has zero meaningful lithography market share. He expects lithography to be the hardest and last tool China indigenizes, making current lithography stockpiles a useful long-term bound.
Brown notes ASML's light sources come from Cymer in the US or Gigaphoton in Japan. If Japan aligns on DUV, the US and Japan can block all immersion systems to China through national light-source controls without using extraterritorial FDPR authority.
Brown says if China keeps importing lithography at its 2024-25 pace and shifts a larger share to AI, the curve bends upward. In that AI-push scenario, China could reach near parity or parity with US chipmaking in about ten years.
Brown's modeling assumes China diverts its entire DUV stockpile to advanced fabs and spends all of it on AI chips. Even under that extreme scenario, physics and lithography throughput leave China well below a tenth of US AI chip production through 2035.
China will likely struggle to indigenously manufacture commercial DUV immersion lithography tools until the mid-2030s, long after domesticating deposition or etch tools. Because only Japan and the Netherlands produce them, lithography remains the West's most durable geopolitical lever.
Brown ran a scenario where China prototypes a seven-nanometer-equivalent DUV next year, reaches commercial production the year after, and scales 100% annually. Even then, existing stockpile plus indigenous production does not come close to US-allied production if imports are cut off.
By 2030, China is expected to have a fully indigenous DUV lithography supply chain, enabling mass production of chips on older process nodes. However, for the most advanced EUV technology, they will likely only have working prototypes and will still be struggling with the 'production hell' required for high-volume manufacturing.
Existing export restrictions left older DUV immersion systems unrestricted, allowing China to double its installed base. Halting all DUV tool flows could cap China's domestic chip production at roughly 10 million chips annually, maintaining a massive US compute advantage.