Despite official statements against rapid currency depreciation in Japan and Korea, policymakers likely view a weaker currency as a beneficial stimulus. With negative output gaps and competition from China, the goal is not to reverse the trend but to manage its pace to avoid market disorder and US Treasury scrutiny.

North Asian economies, despite current account surpluses, exhibit balance-of-payments dynamics typical of deficit countries. This is caused by exporters holding dollars, domestic capital outflows, and foreigners hedging equity investments. This structural imbalance acts as a powerful headwind for regional currencies, overriding positive trade data.

Facing unprecedented government debt, a cycle of money printing and currency devaluation is likely. Investors should follow the lead of central banks, which are buying gold at record rates while holding fewer Treasury bonds, signaling a clear institutional strategy to own hard assets.

A recent global fixed income sell-off was not triggered by a single U.S. event but by a cascade of disparate actions from central banks and data releases in smaller economies like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. This decentralized shift is an unusual dynamic for markets, leading to dollar weakness.

A historical review places 2026 in the second-lowest decile for central bank rate activity (hikes/cuts). This data strongly suggests a contained FX volatility environment, as significant vol spikes historically occur only during periods of extremely high or low central bank intervention.

Despite investor nervousness after a strong 2025, EM currencies could appreciate against the dollar again in 2026. Analysts argue that the 14-year bear market has turned, citing historical precedent from the 2002-2010 bull market where consecutive positive years were common. This challenges the prevailing investor caution.

JPMorgan forecasts a drop in central bank gold purchases in 2026. This isn't a bearish change in strategy, but a mechanical effect of higher prices. At over $4,000/oz, central banks can buy fewer tons to achieve their desired percentage allocation of gold reserves, indicating continued structural demand.

The disinflationary impact from goods prices has largely run its course in emerging markets. The remaining inflation is concentrated in the service sector, which is sticky and less responsive to monetary policy. This structural shift means the broad rate-cutting cycle is nearing its end, as central banks have limited tools to address services inflation.

When countries run large, structural government deficits, their policy options become limited. Historically, this state of 'fiscal dominance' leads to the implementation of capital controls and other financial frictions to prevent capital flight and manage the currency, increasing risks for investors.