Chevron's decision to remain in Venezuela, unlike other oil majors, isn't just about future potential. It's heavily influenced by massive, decades-long sunk costs, including U.S. Gulf Coast refineries specifically optimized to process Venezuela's unique heavy sour crude.
Driven by U.S. shale, Brazilian and Guyanese oil, and Canadian pipelines, the Western Hemisphere's importance in global fossil fuel production has surged to levels not seen in nearly a century. This geographic shift fundamentally alters global energy dependencies and geopolitical focus.
While beneficial for U.S. refiners, a resurgence in Venezuelan production could harm U.S. shale producers. They would face not only lower overall oil prices but also a potential shift in marginal supply growth away from shale towards Venezuela over the next decade, diminishing their market position.
The oil market's lack of reaction to the events in Venezuela demonstrates a key principle: short-to-medium term prices are driven by current production and delivery capacity, not the theoretical size of underground reserves that may take years and billions to develop.
Despite major political upheaval in Venezuela, the oil market's reaction is minimal. This is because the short-term supply impact is ambiguous, with an equal probability of production increasing through U.S. re-engagement or decreasing due to intensified blockades, creating a balanced risk profile.
A potential restart of Venezuelan oil is significant because it is a heavy, diesel-rich crude that has become scarce as U.S. shale dominates supply with light oil. U.S. Gulf Coast refiners, built decades ago, are specifically configured to process this heavy crude, creating a unique high-margin opportunity.
Despite holding the world's largest oil reserves (17%), Venezuela's contribution to global production is minimal (<1%). This critical gap between reserves and output explains why major geopolitical events in the country have little immediate impact on global oil supply or prices.
Unlike more volatile shale production, large-scale offshore projects from Exxon in Guyana and Petrobras in Brazil are sanctioned years in advance. This provides analysts with a highly reliable and visible pipeline of new, low-cost barrels, cementing the forecast for a sustained supply surplus.
The hosts argue that even with vast oil reserves and government encouragement, the political instability, power vacuum, and lack of rule of law in Venezuela make it a poor investment for oil companies. The cost and uncertainty of securing profits are too high.
Chevrolet's surprising dominance in Uzbekistan, where 80% of cars are Chevys, is not due to consumer preference but a historical deal. After the USSR's fall, General Motors took over a local car plant with heavy government subsidies, effectively creating a captive market and making Uzbekistan its #2 market worldwide.
The widely cited 300 billion barrel figure for Venezuela's oil reserves is not a measure of what's currently extractable. True "proven reserves" are a function of oil price, investment, and security, making the economically viable amount far lower than the technical potential.