As its import needs peak, China is positioned to transition from a simple demand center to a sophisticated global LNG trader. Its vast storage capacity, extensive regasification infrastructure, and diverse contract portfolio will provide the flexibility and optionality to resell cargoes and influence global energy flows.
Even as a massive LNG supply glut promises lower prices, emerging Asian markets lack the physical capacity to absorb it. A severe shortage of regasification terminals, storage, and gas-fired power plants creates a hard ceiling on demand growth, meaning cheap gas alone is not enough to clear the market.
With over half of new global LNG supply coming from the US, an impending oversupply will force US export facilities to operate at significantly lower utilization rates. This transforms the US from a simple high-growth exporter into a flexible, market-balancing swing producer, a role it was not designed for.
Contrary to common assumptions, China's future natural gas demand growth will be led by the industrial sector, not power generation. Policy support for manufacturing and lower global LNG prices are expected to drive significant coal-to-gas switching in industrial processes, while gas in the power sector remains a secondary source to balance renewables.
Contrary to common perception, China holds the stronger hand in its relationship with the U.S. As the world's creditor and primary producer, China can sell its goods to billions of other global consumers. The U.S., as a debtor and consumer nation, is far more dependent on China than the other way around.
The rise of destination-flexible U.S. LNG is fundamentally altering global gas markets. By acting as the marginal supplier and an effective 'global storage hub,' the U.S. reduces Europe's strategic need for high storage levels, leading to structurally lower prices and a new market equilibrium.
China's forthcoming economic plan is expected to introduce more stringent environmental rules, potentially moving from GDP intensity-based targets (emissions per unit of GDP) to an absolute cap on total emissions. This policy change would directly limit the consumption of all fossil fuels, including natural gas.
Massive expansion of Russian pipeline capacity, including the Power of Siberia 2, will increase gas flows to China from 38 BCM in 2025 to 106 BCM by 2035. This dramatic increase in secure overland supply is the primary reason why China's demand for seaborne LNG is forecast to peak and then plateau around 2032.
While the U.S. oscillates between trade policies with each new administration, China executes consistent long-term plans, like shifting to high-quality exports. This decisiveness has enabled China to find new global markets and achieve a record trade surplus, effectively outmaneuvering U.S. tactics.
Beyond raw materials, China's national ambition is to achieve near-total self-sufficiency. The prevailing mood is that there is "nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to." This philosophy of aggressive import substitution signals a fundamental break with the logic of reciprocal global trade.
Temasek views the energy transition not as a binary switch from brown to green, but as a gradual progression through many intermediate shades. This pragmatic approach justifies investing in transitional fuels like LNG and advanced technologies like nuclear fusion, acknowledging the need for energy security and affordability.